Putin should tilt toward the EU

by Katinka Barysch and Laza Kekic IHT
Monday, June 16, 2003

Russia at a crossroads

The good atmospherics at the recent U.S.-Russia summit seemed to confirm that George W. Bush is behaving in accord with the divide-and-rule tactics enunciated by his National Security adviser, Condoleezza Rice: Russia is to be "forgiven" its transgressions over Iraq, while Germany and France are to be, respectively, ignored and punished. And President Vladimir Putin of Russia — uncertain of his options — was more than willing to respond. Yet the contrast between the outward demonstration of goodwill and the reality of deep disagreement on a range of issues is a stark one.

Contentious issues include: the very future of the international order; the U.S. pre-emptive strike doctrine; how to deal with nuclear proliferation; the U.S. presence in Central Asia; Iran; and problems in economic relations. Nor can the genuine personal chemistry between the U.S. and Russian leaders offset the fact that Iraq has left a deep and enduring mark.

For more than a year after Sept. 11, 2001, Putin pursued a strong U.S.-centric strategy with the clear and ambitious aim of building a partnership (albeit a junior one) or even alliance with the world's only remaining superpower. This seemed to simultaneously serve Russia's economic, geopolitical and security goals. It meshed well with Russia's traditional primary focus on relations with the United States and was reinforced by apparent ideological affinity. And the United States was far less focused on Russia's internal affairs — including Chechnya — than the bothersome Europeans.

The only problem for Moscow was that the United States showed little interest. It pocketed the gains (such as Russia's material help in Afghanistan), and in return patted Russia on the back, while proceeding to abrogate the ABM Treaty, ensconce itself in the former Soviet south and expand NATO to Russia's doorstep. Bush's respectful manner towards Russia has never meant giving way on any matters of substance.

The record of U.S. unresponsiveness apart, Iraq helps explain why Russia's post-Sept. 11 strategy is now dead and unlikely to be revived. Some of the implications of the conflict — such as the exercise of unbridled power and the confirmation of U.S. global supremacy — are more disturbing for Russia than for most. It is easy to forget that in no other major country was the opposition to the war of government and public alike as vehement as in Russia. The public mood in Russia is sour, and the election season is upon us. The level of trust between U.S. and Russian elites is low. The influence of those in Moscow who continue to press for a pro-U.S. line is limited. All this does not, of course, mean a pursuit of confrontation with America, which Russia could scarcely afford. But keeping relations on an even keel is a far cry from partnership and alliance.

Russia, in fact, now finds itself without a foreign policy strategy. Putin has wisely resisted any temptation to play off America against Europe. But he may be beginning to realize that stronger ties with the European Union would make Russia a weightier partner for the United States. The two sides' mutual interests by far outweigh their differences. Both Russia and the EU support the United Nations and the multilateral approach to international policy-making that it embodies. Both have a strong interest in political stability in the wider Europe. They also need each other in economic terms. Russia conducts more than half of its foreign trade with the EU. The EU relies on Russia for one-fifth of its energy needs. European companies are the biggest foreign investors in Russia's fast-growing economy. Interdependence will grow further once the ten new members — some of whom still have close commercial links with Russia — join the EU in 2004. Unlike Russia's dealings with the United States, its relations with the EU are all substance, no style.

Since many of the obstacles to better EU-Russian relations are of a procedural nature, they may be rather easy to overcome. Russia, for example, needs to set up a government department for European cooperation. The EU needs to bundle its various dealings with Russia into something resembling a long-term strategy. It should consider following NATO's example and set up an EU-Russia Council. With a little more vision, the EU may yet turn out to be the strategic partner that Russia has been looking for.

Katinka Barysch is chief economist of the Center for European Reform; Laza Kekic is director for Eastern Europe at the Economist Intelligence Unit.