US-Russian rapprochement - a victim of the war?

by Katinka Barysch, Centre for European Reform
published: 31 March 2003

The war in Iraq has damaged UN credibility, EU unity and NATO solidarity. It could also spell the end of the remarkable rapprochement between Russia and the US that has taken place since September 11th.

As diplomatic showdown culminated in war, Russian-US relations deteriorated fast. First, Russia joined the anti-war camp in the UN Security Council, threatening to bloc a second resolution (although it heaved a sigh of relief when it did not have to use its veto). Then Vladimir Putin strongly criticised US-British military action in Iraq. The US, in turn, has accused Russian companies of selling arms to Baghdad in violation of UN sanctions. Russia says the US is spying along its southern border. The Russian parliament has put the ratification of the US-Russian arms reduction treaty on ice. The US has done the same with the repeal of the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik amendment that stands in the say of normal trade relations.

Many Americans question Russia's motives. They say Russia wants to salvage commercial ties with Iraq. Others think that President Putin is pandering to anti-war voices with a view to next year's presidential election. Both views are probably wrong. It is true that Russian oil companies signed large-scale contracts with the Iraqi regime in the past. But the validity of these contracts was very much in doubt before the first shot was fired in Iraq. They were in any case suspended until sanctions against Iraq are lifted. Similarly, bankrupt Baghdad could hardly be expected to service its 8 billion dollar debt to Moscow. The Kremlin knows that in terms of business, good relations with the US would far outweigh old contracts signed by Saddam.

Nor is Putin's tough stance on Iraq a publicity stunt. The vast majority of Russians oppose the war. But Putin's popularity ratings have been rock solid - at more than 70 per cent - for years. It is difficult to imagine the kind of foreign policy move that could endanger Putin's re-election.

Putin's real worries are broader. Russia is understandably concerned that US unilateralism could undermine the UN Security Council - one of the last fora where Russia, thanks to its veto, enjoys something akin to equality with the world's great powers. Moreover, Russia wants to remind the US that the partnership forged after September 11th has become somewhat lopsided. Putin has responded with equanimity when the US violated previously sacrosanct foreign policy principles, for example by moving troops into Central Asia, abrogating the ABM treaty or supporting NATO's eastward enlargement. Now Putin wants something in return. That something could be open acknowledgement of Russian interests in the Gulf region; a more co-operative US stance in the UN; or stronger US support for Russia's pending WTO application. Putin's pro-US policies after September 11th were based on a strategic choice not emotional solidarity. Putin would like to stick to this choice. But for this, he may need a little more reciprocity from Washington.

Why should the Bush administration care? With a decaying army and a mid-sized economy, Russia hardly constitutes a threat for the US. But Washington should not discount Russia's usefulness as an ally. Russia's extensive ties with the Iraqi military and political elite could be crucial for building a post-Saddam regime. Russian engineers know the Iraqi oil industry inside out, which could again be useful in post-war reconstruction.

Beyond Iraq, Russia could play a role in helping the US resolve its disputes with Iran and North Korea over their alleged nuclear weapons programmes. The regime in Pyongyang has recently kicked out weapons inspectors, withdrawn from the non-proliferation treaty, re-started plutonium production and tried to scare its neighbours with war threats, test missile and fighter jets. Most experts agree that North Korea is not too far from developing nuclear weapons. The US knows that threats and isolation are not the way forward. But after years of hawkish rhetoric and a recent diplomatic showdown, the Republican administration finds it difficult to re-start a dialogue. It needs help. China has better contacts with, and leverage over, Pyongyang than any other country, but it appears reluctant to use them. Russia is probably the only other country that enjoys at least some trust in Pyongyang. Moscow is already part of a multilateral effort to get Kim Jong Il back to the negotiating table and it could help the US avoid a all-out conflict with North Korea by trying to mediate.

In Iran, Russia could be as much part of the problem as of the solution. The US has long criticised Russia for supporting the construction of Iran's Bushehr nuclear reactor. Moscow insists that it is only helping Teheran to develop civil nuclear technology, but Washington believes that the Bushehr plant could enable Iran to produce weapons-grade plutonium. Russian co-operation could be crucial for keeping Iran's atomic energy industry within the bounds of the non-proliferation treaty.

Also very much in the American interest is Russia's contribution and commitment to the international war against terrorism. Russia has helped the US by sharing intelligence and acquiescing to US troop deployments along the Central Asian borders of Afghanistan. Moreover, as an individual player on the world stage rather than a member of any 'old' or 'new' European alliances, Russia will remain an important partner for the US post-Iraq. The recent chill in US-Russian relations does not (yet) represent a rapture. But it should serve as a reminder to both sides that their mutual interests across a wide variety of issues outweigh differences over Iraq.

Centre for European Reform © CER 2003