Tough love for our Eastern neighbours by Heather Grabbe and Henning Tewes

In 2004, Europe's political map will change fundamentally. With the enlargement of the European Union and NATO, all the countries that once belonged to the Warsaw Pact will be a member of one of the two institutions. This means, however, that there will be new outsiders east of the EU: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Few people in today's EU know or care much about their new neighbours - and it is up to Poland to show them that their own security will depend on eastern policy.

TOUGH LOVE FOR OUR EASTERN NEIGHBOURS

By Heather Grabbe and Henning Tewes*

published 27 June 2003

The EU needs to engage much more deeply with its new neighbours if it wants to ensure their stability and facilitate economic development, but also to guarantee the security of its own citizens. The European Commission has made a good start by publishing a paper on a 'wider Europe' in March 2003. This paper proposes some principles for EU institutions and member-states to achieve greater integration. The EU aims to surround itself with a "ring of friends", to ensure social cohesion and economic dynamism for existing and new members, as well as neighbouring states. The Commission rules out future EU membership for the southern Mediterranean countries, but leaves open the possibility of accession for the East Europeans.

The Commission's proposals are welcome, but the EU now needs to put political will behind them. This is an area where Poland has a significant contribution to make when it takes up its new role as one of the six largest member-states. Poland has expertise, knowledge and historical experience to offer, and its rapprochement with Ukraine is one of the greatest successes of post-Cold War foreign policy in Europe. The Polish foreign ministry has already published some principles for eastern policy, and now considers how to make them work in practice.

The EU will have to agree on the interests it wants to pursue, and on how it can achieve its aims. We see the best strategy as one of 'tough love' - offering greater inclusion but also tougher conditionality, in requiring countries to uphold democratic standards before the EU grants benefits to them. The relationship should be founded on closer security co-operation and economic integration. But the strategy should not just include political dialogue between Brussels and national capitals; it should also include people-to-people contact through the development of links between civil societies across Europe.

Our strategy emphasises inclusion and progressive integration rather than focusing on the question of eventual membership. None of the countries on the EU's future eastern border will be able to become an EU member in the foreseeable future. Although Ukraine has toyed with the idea, it has not embarked upon a course of domestic political and economic reform that would allow it to join anytime soon. Nevertheless, the EU should not rule out membership forever.

Soft security, not just military co-operation

Security on the European continent increasingly depends not just on traditional 'hard' security to protect countries from armed attack, but also 'soft' security for citizens threatened by cross-border crime, terrorism, and lawlessness. The EU cannot ensure the security of its people without the co-operation of neighbouring countries in combating these non-military threats. Now that the EU has removed most of its internal border checks, it relies on its external frontiers to control the flow of people and illicit goods that might threaten the Union. But it also has to allow legitimate travellers and business-people to move freely between the enlarged EU and the wider Europe if it is to achieve deeper economic integration with neighbouring countries. To achieve these goals, there is no alternative but to work closely with neighbouring countries.

Co-operation on 'hard security' is also important, especially with Russia, the military power in the region. The EU cannot compete with the security relationship that Washington has formed with Moscow in the aftermath of September 11th 2001. Moreover, EU policy should be complementary to US policy, not in competition with it. The Union should therefore focus on areas where it has something else to offer Russia - and most of these are in 'soft security' matters like peacekeeping operations and policing.

Four areas of potential security co-operation with Russia and Ukraine are particularly promising. First, the EU should support and enhance joint policing and peace-keeping operations with these countries, such as the NATO operations in Macedonia and Bosnia. Second, as the EU moves closer to a common procurement and armaments development policy, it should work with Russia to develop a common approach. If a prime western concern today is Russia's exports of arms and technology to Iran, China and North Korea, the objective should be to re-direct Russia's military-industrial complex towards other markets. One way to do that is to offer more access for Russian arms to European markets.

Third, the EU should create a forum for common decision-making with both Russia and Ukraine in parallel with the NATO-Russia Council. The forum should be a special part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Although it might make sense to leave Ukraine out of the NATO-Russia Council, that does not make sense for the EU. The EU's special ESDP council for common decision-making should include both countries as strategically important neighbours.

Fourth, the EU should deepen its co-operation with Ukraine and Russia on policing and judicial matters. In the fight against organised crime, illegal migration and international terrorism, this domestic side of foreign policy is becoming ever more important. The EU already provides considerable financial support to Ukraine on justice and home affairs; for example, the EU is helping to build better law enforcement capacity, to counter money laundering and to train border guards.

At the same time, the EU should avoid selling co-operation below its real price. The EU is a club of democratic countries which are tied to one another on the basis of their values. The Union should continue to express its objections to Russian human rights abuses in Chechnya and elsewhere, and to violations of human rights and civil liberties in Ukraine and Belarus.

Economic reforms are the key to prosperity

The EU supports WTO membership for both Russia and Ukraine, which would give them better access to the world markets and improve conditions for investment. But how willing is the EU to offer access to its own markets in order to encourage reforms? The EU has offered negotiations on a 'Common European Economic Area', but it demands substantial adjustments from Russia and Ukraine for uncertain benefits. The EU requires major regulatory convergence and radical internal reforms (including the energy sector) from its partners, but it refuses to open up its markets for sensitive products - particularly agriculture, textiles and steel. Belarusian exports to the EU amount to a bare 10% of its overall exports, Ukrainian 16-19%, and Russian 35% (the last proportion is higher because of Russia's exports of natural resources). Greater market access to the EU, however, is important not only for economic modernisation but to encourage a pro-western course. For Poland, trade liberalisation is especially sensitive, because the Polish steel and agricultural sectors will come under pressure if market access for Ukrainian and Russian products is eased. But ultimately our neighbours need trade, not aid.

WTO membership would help Russian and Ukraine greatly. They would still be subject to EU anti-dumping actions, but they would gain access to the WTO's dispute settlement mechanisms. However, the EU seems to be aiming to use Russia's low energy prices as a justification for anti-dumping measures even after WTO accession. The EU's willingness to help Russia on this issue will be a benchmark of its commitment to a deeper economic relationship.

Engage with civil society, not just governments

The EU is a democratic club, and it has spent more than a decade persuading the candidate countries of central and eastern Europe to adopt and implement its democratic principles. This policy has been very successful, but the Union now has to try to extend this strategy to its new neighbours without being able to offer rapid accession as an inducement for rapid progress. The EU needs to build a package of interim rewards - such as aid, trade and political ties - to offer in return for its neighbours' progress towards respect for the rule of law, the strengthening of the judicial system, competitive elections, independence of the media, and respect for political parties, interest group and non-governmental organisations.

The EU should follow a twin-track approach to encouraging democratisation in Belarus. At the governmental level, access to the EU should continue to be conditional on improvements in the Lukashenka regime's regard for civil liberties and democratic freedoms. At the same time, the EU should engage directly with civil society organisations in Belarus - from political parties to universities and schools - to increase its links with the people of Belarus. The current government cannot continue forever, and the EU must invest in relationships with the country's future political leaders and the next generation of Belarusians.

The EU's nature is to demand a considerable degree of adjustment from its partners. In Poland and other countries that will soon join the EU, the costs of this adjustment are the price of membership. But for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, EU membership is not on the agenda. The EU thus needs to induce co-operation by offering tangible, immediate benefits in return for their progress towards meeting its norms and adopting its values. The EU should be moderate in tone, but firm on substance. Tough love means being consistent in our demands but unwavering in our support for reforms.

Heather Grabbe is Deputy Director of the Centre for European Reform, in London; and Henning Tewes is Director of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Poland. They have co-organised a 'think-tank forum' on the eastern policy of the enlarged EU starting on 29 June- 1 July, in collaboration with the British Council, Agora SA and PricewaterhouseCoopers Poland.