The not-so-big three by Heather Grabbe and Ulrike Guérot
The not-so-big three by
Heather Grabbe and Ulrike Guérot
published: 26 February 2004
Last week's trilateral
summit between the British, French and German leaders was notable for the brouhaha
it stirred up, not its tangible results. But although it achieved little in
concrete terms, it was an important sign of how politics will work in the 25-member
EU. Groups of countries are likely to get together more often to discuss issues
of common interest.
The question is whether these groups will mostly be led by France and Germany--as
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac
would like--or whether the other EU countries will revolt against big-country
domination. The new wrinkle is that Paris and Berlin are hoping to turn their
big-country duo into a trio by bringing in London.
With Franco-German increasingly discredited in the past 18 months, this tactic
makes perfect sense. To their surprise, Messrs. Schröder and Chirac have
found they can't appoint themselves the EU's leaders. Most other countries no
longer want to follow them most of the time, and instead have come to resent
them. France and Germany teamed up to block reform of the EU's farm budget in
2002. A few months later, they tried to speak for Europe in opposing the US-led
war in Iraq--only to be publicly contradicted by the more numerous Atlanticist
countries in a letter published by this newspaper. At the end of 2003, Germany
and France were again on the other side of a divide from Poland and Spain, this
time over the issue of reforming the voting system of the Council of Ministers.
And the duo irritated many of their partners by pleading for a suspension of
the Stability and Growth Pact's sanctions mechanism when both countries were
found guilty of breaching its fiscal rules.
After the talks on a new EU constitution collapsed last December, Mr. Chirac
lobbied other European leaders to form a core group along with France and Germany.
But he found very few who would agree even in principle. Even among the other
founding members of the Union, only Belgium is really enthusiastic about the
idea. The Italians, Dutch and Luxemburgers rapidly distanced themselves from
it. So Messrs. Chirac and Schröder are courting the British.
If this triangle can agree, they reason, the rest of Europe can follow, because
they represent such different viewpoints: the Atlanticist British are the economic
liberals; the Germans are more pacifist, slower at economic reform and have
closer ties with the eastern countries; and the French look south towards the
Mediterranean and are protectionist on agriculture.
But the three leaders are having little luck in finding concrete issues on which
to co-operate. That's partly because their policies are so far apart, but also
because there is no obvious big project that would galvanize the EU as a whole.
Last week's summit, called to forge a joint agenda on economic policy, produced
only dull texts that repeat many items already on the EU's 'Lisbon agenda' on
competitiveness.
Instead of lecturing the rest of Europe, the French and German leaders need
to work on liberalizing their own economies and making them more flexible. But
their ability to shape reform elsewhere is also limited. The EU already has
firmly established institutions and elaborate rules for its economic and regulatory
policies. The main areas left untouched are the ones where London has a fundamentally
different view from Paris and Berlin--such as taxation and social security.
And outside the eurozone, U.K. is excluded from the major decisions on macroeconomic
policy.
In practice, large-country leadership only works in the areas of foreign policy
and defense where Britain, France and Germany have the diplomatic clout and
military assets to make a difference. The trilateral summit will have a lasting
effect only if it deepens co-operation between the three countries' foreign
ministries. The triangle has had some notable successes in recent months: They
agreed to give the EU a limited military planning capability, and the three
foreign ministers together persuaded the Iranians to comply with International
Atomic Energy Agency inspections. Next on the list might be a major move on
Syria.
Such initiatives are welcome if they boost the EU's ability to speak with one
voice in the rest of the world. But the Big Three need to work harder to gain
their partners' support. It would have cost the foreign ministers little to
take Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Policy, on the
plane with them to Teheran; but it would have made the mission a truly European
one. The other big countries--Italy, Poland and Spain--will insist on being
included on external policy in the future. The smaller countries are also anxious
to be involved, because their influence in the world depends on the EU having
a common foreign and security policy.
If the big boys try to gang up too often, they will provoke resentful counter-alliances
among the other countries. Just before last week's summit, Italy, Poland and
Spain and three reform-minded smaller countries sent a letter that implicitly
criticized France and Germany's behavior on the Stability and Growth Pact .
Germany has most to lose from alienating the rest of the EU. Berlin's long-term
approach to relations with its neighbors has been to build strong partnerships
with the small EU members and seek reconciliation with Eastern Europe. But recently
Berlin has abandoned its role as the advocate of the small countries' interests.
Moreover, after 10 years of building bridges with its eastern neighbors, Germany
has seen its relations with Poland deteriorate dramatically since 2002. If Germany
throws away all these carefully nurtured ties for the sake of its alliance with
France, it could shake the whole architecture of the EU. The whole point of
European integration was to domesticate the German giant, not to build up a
new hegemonic group.
France has an even greater need to repair its relations with the new members
of the Union. The Central and East Europeans are still smarting from Jacques
Chirac's comments last year that they missed a good opportunity to shut up about
Iraq. France was never enthusiastic about enlargement either. It needs to reassure
the new members that it can be a reliable partner.
Instead of pursuing the pipe-dream of forming an exclusive alliance that runs
Europe, the Big Three should work harder to find a compromise agreement on the
EU's new constitution. The 25-member Union does not need a permanent leadership
group. It needs a system that allows better decision-making in the interests
of all.
Ms.
Grabbe is deputy director of the Center for European Reform in London and Ms.
Guérot is director, foreign policy-Europe, at the Berlin office of the
German Marshall Fund of the United States.