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The
twin peaks of European leadership Now Mr Chirac and Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor - who are trying hard to revive the Franco-German alliance - have tabled a compromise: a European Council president, to be chosen by the heads of government, together with a Commission president elected by the European parliament. Once again, an agreement between Paris and Berlin is set to shape the EU's institutional development. But this is no giant leap forward in European integration. It is a sensible deal that would respect the EU's division of power between the centre and the member states. Since this twin-presidency idea gives something to both the federalist and the intergovernmental camps, the convention will probably back it. It is likely to kill off the rival scheme of Joschka Fischer, German foreign minister, and others, for the Commission and the European Council to share the same president. There is a strong case for the appointment of a senior politician to chair the European Council. That body is proving increasingly incapable of providing strategic leadership to the EU. Currently the prime minister of the country with the rotating presidency chairs the Council but this term lasts only six months, which means that the incumbent cannot make much impact. In 2004, when the Council expands to include 25 heads of government, it is likely to become even less effective. One crucial role for the new president would be to represent the EU externally, at the highest level. Neither the Commission president nor Javier Solana, high representative for foreign and security policy, has the credibility to visit the White House or the Kremlin to discuss big strategic issues. Nor would a new EU foreign minister - a post proposed in the convention and now supported by Mr Chirac and Mr Schröder, which would fuse the roles of Mr Solana and Christopher Patten, the commissioner for external relations. The new president, serving a five-year term, would also have an important internal role. After meetings of the European Council, prime ministers regularly fail to fulfil their promises. The president would badger them to do so. He or she would have few formal powers. A successful president would have a strong personality but also the trust of national leaders. The small member states do not like this idea. They fear that the new president would strengthen the intergovernmental side of the EU, which the big countries tend to dominate, at the expense of the Commission, which they see as their friend and protector. Hence Mr Schröder's insistence that he would not accept the new president unless the overall institutional balance of the Union was preserved. Mr Blair will be reluctant to accept an enhanced role for the European parliament, which is not his favourite institution. Some British officials fear the arrival of a more party-political Commission: could it make objective judgments on, say, competition policy if its leader had a clear mandate from one of the parliament's political parties? But such worries are misplaced. So long as national governments continue to appoint the other commissioners, the Commission will remain a multi-party institution. If Mr Blair wants the European Council to have a new president, he will have to accept a role for the parliament in choosing the Commission president. He may be able to sugar that pill if he can persuade the convention that a congress of national and European parliamentarians should do the choosing. But France and Germany have once again made the pill for Britain to swallow. Ever since Mr Chirac became French president in 1995, the Franco-German alliance, which once dominated the EU, has been in disarray. Are this couple now back together? The agreements last October between the French and German leaders on farm spending, and now on the institutions, are impressive demonstrations of public affection. But the personal chemistry remains combustible. Mr Schröder would probably prefer to have close relations with a number of countries, including Britain, rather than be monogamously wed to France. Furthermore, once the EU has grown to 25 countries it will be impossible for any two members, however close, to dominate. That said, some figures close to Mr Schröder claim it is partly Britain that has pushed Germany - rather against its better judgment - back into bed with France. For Britain now appears unlikely to join the euro in the near future. And that means, they say, that the UK is neither a completely trustworthy nor a viable partner for big decisions on the future of the EU. The writer is
director of the Centre for European Reform Centre for European Reform © CER 2003 |