published in the Wall
Street Journal, 15 March 2006
MINSK - To a first-time visitor, the capital of Belarus seems normal. People
look content, streets are clean and orderly, and cafés ring with lively
and frank exchanges. Campaign posters for the four candidates in Sunday's presidential
elections are pinned to the walls of public buildings. Opposition candidates
were granted two 15-minute slots on radio and TV. One of them, Alexander Kozulin,
used his time to claim that President Alexander Lukashenko leads a dishonourable
private life.
Alas, in Europe's most authoritarian state, normalcy is deceptive. In the run-up
to the election, the government detained leading opposition figures and closed
independent newspapers. State TV is a propaganda arm of the president. As for
Mr Kozulin, his second 15-minute spot was censored, and he later got beaten
up by policemen. No one seriously doubts, especially not the opposition, that
the election outcome will be fixed to give MR Lukashenko a great victory.
Yet mass protests are unlikely, much less another 'colour revolution' in this
neighbourhood. The opposition hand out blue ribbons, but it's hard to find anyone
who wears them. They've drawn no more than a thousand people to their rallies.
Belarus differs from Ukraine, whose 2004 elections sparked the 'Orange revolution'.
President Leonid Kuchma led a softer regime that gave the opposition far more
space to maneuver than Mr Lukashenko does in Belarus. Ukraine's revolution was
led by established politicians, such as Viktor Yushchenko and Julia Timoshenko,
while the leading opposition candidates in Belarus - Alexander Milinkevich and
Mr Kazulin - are little known and untested. And the incumbent Belarus remains
very popular with a large chunk of the population.
Since being elected in the last free as fair vote in 1994 on an anti-corruption
platform, Mr Lukashenko has delivered stability and relative prosperity. The
economy grew 8 per cent last year and 10 per cent the year before, thanks to
cheap oil imports from Russia that Belarus refines and exports on to the EU,
as well as strong demand for their finished manufactured goods, like tractors
and refrigerators, in the markets o of the old USSR. Mr Lukashenko has strengthened
the Belarusans' weak sense of national identity, standing up to not only the
West but also, at times, Russia. He refuses to adopt the Russian ruble or cede
control of Belarus's gas pipelines to Gazprom, even as he continues to talk
of possible "reunification" with Russia.
For the EU, the bug question is how to react to Mr Lukashenko's 're-election'.
The current policy of 'conditional engagement' has failed. In 1998, the EU suspended
its partnership and co-operation agreement with Belarus; it has imposed visa
bans on a few of the shadier government officials; and it has excluded Belarus
from it's 'neighbourhood policy', by which the EU offers countries trade, aid
and political carrots to reform.
In spite of the EU's efforts, the Belarusan regime has become steadily more
authoritarian. "What can the EU offer us compared to Russia?" asks
the clever and combative foreign minister, Sergei Martynov. "Russia provides
stable supplies of oil and gas at a good price, and access to an open market
of 200 million people [in former Soviet countries]. The EU's neighbourhood policy
would not even give us [complete] access to the single market."
But Belarus's economy depends as much on trade with the EU as with Russia;
each take about 40 per cent of its exports. The regime has a kind of split personality.
On the one hand it bristles against Western attempts to change its political
system, and complains about the EU shunning it; on the other it worries about
dependency on Russia, which briefly cut off gas supplies two years ago, resists
privatization lest Russian oligarchs buy its prime companies, and knows that
Western investment would help its economy. So the EU does have some leverage.
Cutting off trade would maybe destabilize the regime, yet also hurt ordinary
Belarusans, which the EU is rightly reluctant to do. The bloc also gives money
to help clean up radioactivity left by the Chernobyl disaster to strengthen
border security and to combat drug trafficking. The government is content to
see Brussels finance such projects. But the EU has largely failed to get aid
to the NGOs that work to strengthen civil society. The rules of the Commission's
Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights are so complex and inflexible that
few NGO's can benefit. They say that American institutions, such as the National
Endowment for Democracy, are better at getting money to the right people.
The EU can't afford to ignore the country. Unless Belarus better governed and
market-orientated, it could experience the kind of social, political and economic
spasms that will spill over the Union. As part of a new approach to Belarus,
Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief should fly to Minsk straight after
the election to warn that any clampdown on the opposition would have consequences.
Visa bans can be extended to all those involved, and in the event of bloodshed,
prohibitions on trade and investment may be inevitable.
But at the same time Mr Solana should make one final attempt to engage the regime.
In return for a series of steps towards political liberalization, he should
offer much more money for the projects the government likes and support for
Belarus joining the Council of Europe, which Minsk is keen to do. He can also
point out that if Belarus qualifies for the EU's neighbourhood policy, it would
gain increased access to R&D programs and the single market.
In the longer term, the EU should focus on strengthening civil society. It ought
to scrap the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights and transfer
the money to a new and independent agency, modeled on America's National Endowment
for Democracy. This should have the flexibility to finance the most deserving
NGOs. Not only Belarus, but every state whose pro-democracy forces need outside
help would gain.
The EU can make it easier for Belarusans to travel. Today they have to pay $50-100
to obtain visas for many EU countries, which is a big deterrent; the EU should
stabilize the cost of cheaper visas. It can do more to help Belarusans study
abroad. And money can be well spent helping them learn what's going on in the
world. A useful start is a scheme that finances Deutche Welle to broadcast into
the country and distributed inside.
Finally, the EU could try harder to engage Moscow over Belarus. Most Russians
regard Belarus as part of their own backyard, but now that several of its neighbours
are in the EU, it is in Brussels' backyard too. The EU should stress that it
does not see Belarus as a pawn in a geopolitical game; that it understands Belarus
will remain close to Russia, culturally, economically and militarily, whatever
the regime in Minsk; and that a democratic Belarus - so long as it was stable
- would be easier for Russia to deal with than the current regime.
Charles Grant is director and Mark Leonard is director of foreign policy
at the Centre for European Reform.
