A plan to revive transatlantic relations

By Charles Grant

Published - 9 November 2004

In the aftermath of George W Bush's election victory, Atlanticists and multilateralists in both Europe and America are swathed in gloom. Bush fought on a platform of 'America first', criticising his opponent for being too willing to consult allies and defer to the United Nations. The conservatives who dominate the Republican Party are in no mood to soften the unilateralist rhetoric of the first term, or to treat Europe with greater respect. Meanwhile many senior European policy-makers have sunk into despair. They have struggled to work with the Bush people for the past four years, often with great difficulty, and are appalled at the prospect of having to deal with an even more truculent and self-confident team in the second term. Some of them see little point in making an effort to engage the US, arguing that Europe should focus on its own concerns and ignore Washington until the regime changes.

But both the nationalist Americans and the ignore-the-US Europeans are wrong. For the security problems faced by the US and the EU are too grave for either of them to tackle effectively on their own. Many senior figures in the Bush entourage understand this. They know there are two ways for an American president to become multilateralist. One is through instinct: when Bill Clinton faced an international problem, he would often try to deal with it through friends and allies, as a first option. The other way is through experience, when unilateral routes have been exhausted. Thus President Bush is pursuing six-party talks as the best means of getting North Korea to abandon its plans for nuclear weapons. Bush also knows that bodies such as the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Authority have their uses: UNSC resolutions have given at least some legitimacy to the Allawi government in Iraq, while International Atomic Energy Agency inspections have revealed that Iran has breached commitments that it gave on its nuclear energy programme. Bush's second term could turn out more multilateralist than the first, for many of the problems he faces cannot be easily tackled without the help of allies and international organisations.

The most serious of all is the combustible state of the broader Middle East. Many Palestinians see no peaceful route towards statehood. In Iraq the security situation remains dire and the government has yet to win the confidence of many Iraqis. In Iran, neither the European strategy of engagement nor the US policy of isolation seems to have yet deterred the regime from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

If the Europeans and Americans worked together on these problems, they would stand a real chance of achieving progress. President Bush should invite European leaders to a summit with the express purpose of developing a transatlantic strategy for Israel-Palestine, Iraq and Iran. Both Americans and Europeans would have to be ready to rethink some of their current positions. On Israel-Palestine, the US should promise to re-energise the peace process. And it should be prepared to put pressure on Israel to desist from policies that make it harder to pursue the path set out in the 'road map' (the president's father showed that a Republican administration can apply that kind of pressure). Americans and Europeans should jointly declare that the road map's goal of a viable Palestinian state and a secure Israel will be achieved by 2007. For their part the Europeans should put more time and money into building up the administration and security forces of the Palestinian Authority, but apply greater conditionality to their financial support.

A renewed American commitment to tackle the Israel-Palestine problem would transform perceptions of the US, across the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, in a wholly positive way. The recent decline of America's moral authority and prestige has seriously impaired its ability to shape events, create a stable world order and thus ensure the security of Americans.

A new American stance on the Middle East peace process would also encourage greater European flexibility on Iraq and Iran. Those European states which opposed the war in Iraq should make a major financial commitment to the reconstruction of the country, and boost their role in the training of Iraqi forces (it is not realistic to suppose that France or Germany would send troops to Iraq). On Iran, the Europeans should agree to impose severe sanctions - if and when the regime has clearly spurned the effort to place its nuclear facilities under international supervision. For its part the US would have to accept that a joint transatlantic policy of offering carrots and sticks is the one most likely to convince the Iranians to set aside their nuclear ambitions. That means the US would have to be willing to recognise Iran and promise not to overthrow the regime (a promise it has made to North Korea).

The US and the EU face plenty of other common challenges. One is global warming. Europeans have to accept that Bush is not going to endorse the Kyoto protocol. However, American public opinion is becoming much more concerned about global warming, and several states are embracing the principle of carbon emissions trading. The administration is putting $1.7 billion into research on hydrogen power, which has the potential to curb carbon emissions. The EU has created its own emissions trading system, which is now becoming a model for the rest of the world. So it is well-placed to talk to the US about what system for reducing carbon emissions should come after Kyoto, how China and India can be brought into such a mechanism, and what kind of emissions trading system would best suit US interests.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and their possible confluence with international terrorism, is arguably the world's most serious security problem in the coming decades. One weakness in the current anti-proliferation regime is that the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) effectively allows a country to develop nuclear weapons, and then withdraw from the treaty before deploying them. An NPT review conference meets next May. The EU and the US should work together, and with Russia and China (which has in recent years started to take proliferation seriously) to introduce a new and more stringent regime. For example Nuclear Suppliers Group (made up of countries with advanced civilian nuclear power industries) could agree to cut off supplies of nuclear materials to countries which refuse to adopt the IAEA's 'additional protocol' of extra safeguards. Meanwhile Europeans and American should work to strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative, the group of countries that is committed to stamping out the illegal trade of WMD. They should persuade China to follow Russia's example and join the initiative.

The EU's enlargement has given it a new 'near abroad'. Belarus and Ukraine now border the EU, while Moldova will do so when Romania joins the Union in 2007. In due course, as Turkey moves closer to the EU, the Caucasus states will become neighbours of the Union. Russia still sees these countries as its 'back yard' and refuses to discuss them with the EU; it overtly supports anti-democratic forces in Ukraine and Belarus; and it illegally keeps armies in parts of Moldova and Georgia. The US and the EU share a common interest in collaborating to nurture the independence of these countries, as well as democratic standards within them.

The EU and US should also develop a common strategy for Russia itself. They should welcome Russia's integration into the global economy, and its help in fighting terrorism and WMD proliferation. But they should be more willing to speak out when the government breaches democratic norms or when Russian forces behave in ways that are likely to worsen the problems in Chechnya. Too many western leaders have been over-indulgent of President Putin, perhaps because they have wanted to maintain their own 'special' relationship with him.

In addition to such joint initiatives, both the EU and the US should take solo steps to reinvigorate their relationship. The US should declare itself in favour of a more united Europe - the position of most administrations since the second world war. Any attempt to oppose European integration, or to encourage the split between 'New' and 'Old' Europe (pro- and anti-American) would be counter-productive. If there is one policy guaranteed to boost support for Jacques Chirac's idea that Europe should be built in opposition to the US, it is American hostility to the EU. Americans need to accept that a more integrated Europe is in their long-term interests, even though there will be times when Europe disagrees with them. The EU will usually be on the same side as the US, helping it to tackle the world's problems, because its fundamental interests and values are closer to America's than those of any other significant power.

The EU needs to turn itself into a more credible and effective international actor. Ratifying the constitutional treaty would help, so that the new foreign policy machinery - with a 'foreign minister' replacing the rotating presidency, and a new diplomatic service - can be set up. European governments must redouble their efforts to improve their military capabilities, with the focus on improving their ability to deploy and sustain troops in distant places. The EU should state explicitly that it takes prime responsibility for security crises on its own continent, and - in partnership with the increasingly competent African Union - in Africa. Such a commitment would allow the US to free-up resources for parts of the world which are more pertinent to its strategic interests. Above all, New and Old Europe need to put past rancour behind them and pool their efforts to make the Union stronger and more influential. Then the Americans - whatever their gut instincts - will have more compelling reasons to take the EU seriously, and to act multilaterally

Finally, both sides should think seriously about a new institution to foster high-level strategic thinking on big global issues. NATO cannot play that role: its ambit is limited to security policy and military matters, while some European governments (and some senior figures in the US administration) no longer treat it as a first-rank organisation. Nor can the annual EU-US summits, which are dominated by the details of a bureaucrat-driven agenda. Once a year the US president and his cabinet should get together with the top EU officials and the heads of government of the larger member-states (and a few of the smaller ones who would take part by rotation). Officials and journalists should be kept out. Fireside chats and walks in the woods would help European and American leaders to build up the trust and confidence that a constructive transatlantic relationship requires.

America's conservative nationalists may find this kind of jaw-jaw thoroughly uncongenial. But they have to accept the fact that while Bush faces no serious challenge to his authority at home, he cannot easily impose his will on the rest of the world. His budget deficit is unsustainable and his army is over-stretched. New powers are gaining strength, while failing states are breeding conflict and disorder. America on its own cannot create global order.

A shorter version of this piece will appear in the December edition of Prospect.

Centre for European Reform © CER 2004