The draft constitution that came out of the European convention has few eloquent defenders. But its critics are forceful, passionate and - sometimes - inclined to hyperbole. They range from free-marketeers who claim the constitution will make Europe more socialist, to leftists who accuse it of enshrining free-market principles, to eurosceptics who fear it will create a federal Europe, to federalists who resent the preponderant role that it gives to the EU's governments vis-à-vis its institutions.

The constitution faces an uncertain future. The governments may unpick parts of it during the current inter-governmental conference. And the final text must then be ratified by each of the 25 present and future member-states before it enters into force. Some of those countries will hold referenda, and it is far from certain that all 25 will approve the document.

However, this constitution is worth fighting for. Although imperfect, it would - if implemented - make the EU's institutions simpler to understand and more efficient. Many of the criticisms levelled at the constitution, particularly from free-marketeers and eurosceptics, are wide of the mark.

Some economic liberals claim that the document's citations of concepts such as social justice, sustainable development, free and fair trade, and social cohesion, would shift EU economic governance in an interventionist direction. Those terms appear where the constitution lists the EU's objectives. They are aspirations - just like "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" in the US constitution - and are not enforceable by courts of law. Those parts of the constitution which cover economic policy-making do not give the EU fresh powers - for example decisions on tax and social security remain subject to unanimity. They merely consolidate the existing treaties.

Therefore the constitution, like its predecessors, is strongly imbued with economic liberalism. That is why the "Nouveau Monde" and the "Nouveau Parti Socialiste" factions of the French Socialist Party, which between them represent two-fifths of the members, oppose the constitution. Their statement claims - without great exaggeration - that "it consecrates the constitutional triumph of the liberal market economy" and "[creates] an offensive against public services". And that is why a judge from Germany's constitutional court, Siegfried Gross, recently claimed in an article in a legal journal that that the principle of competition, enshrined in the EU constitution, contravenes the German constitution's principles of solidarity and fairness.

Economic liberals also worry about the constitution's incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which includes 'social' provisions such as the rights to strike and to join a trade union. They fear that law courts could invoke the charter to create new, legally-binding rights for workers. Yet the text states very clearly that the charter applies only to the application of EU, rather than national law, that nothing in it extends the competences of the EU, and that it should be interpreted to take into account national laws and practices. Thus EU employees would have a guaranteed right to strike, but not the hundreds of thousands of German civil servants who do not currently have that right.

So the constitution would not make the EU more interventionist, but it would make it easier to understand. The clutch of existing treaties are consolidated into a single document. The constitution defines which policy areas are the preserve of the Union, which are for the member-states and which are shared. It says that the Council of Ministers should debate and vote on laws in public. The constitution replaces 15 different forms of legal act by six. And it strengthens subsidiarity, the principle that the EU should only act when it is better placed to do so than national governments. Companies and individuals would gain the right to appeal directly to the European Court of Justice to enforce subsidiarity, while if national parliaments believed that a Commission proposal breached that principle, they could ask it to think again. Furthermore, for the first time the EU gains a states' rights clause: "Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the member-states."

One of the best things in the constitution is the abolition of the rotating presidency, the system whereby a different member-state takes over the chairmanship of the EU every six months. Each presidency pushes its own national priorities, which has been particularly damaging to the EU's relations with the rest of the world. Instead, a new 'foreign minister' - fusing the jobs currently held by the external relations commissioner, Chris Patten, and the High Representative for foreign policy, Javier Solana - would chair meetings of foreign ministers and represent the Union. At the highest level a new 'EU president' would chair the European Council and speak for the EU to other world leaders. These changes should make it easier for the Union to develop more coherent foreign policies.

Another plus in the constitution is a new system for taking votes, known as 'double majority'. The Nice treaty bequeathed extremely complex voting rules, under which a measure cannot pass the Council of Ministers without satisfying three tests. Under the new rules, a measure would be carried when a majority of member-states was in favour, so long as they represented at least 60 per cent of the EU's population. This system would allow legislation to pass more speedily, since blocking minorities would be harder to construct. It is also easy to understand and fairer than any previous EU voting system, since it attaches an equal weight to the equality of states and to the size of their populations.

However, Spain and Poland did very well out of the deal struck late at night at Nice in December 2000. Bizarrely, this gave them 27 votes, against the 29 that went to Britain, France, Italy and Germany - despite their having considerably larger populations (Germany's population is more than that of Spain and Poland combined). Spain and Poland are threatening to block the constitution unless the Nice voting rules are restored, and this issue promises to be the most intractable in the IGC.

The EU's biggest problem is not its institutions, but rather the slow growth of its economies and the poor implementation of the Lisbon economic reform agenda. The constitution will not fix these problems - though it will help at the margin by making it easier to pass those parts of the Lisbon agenda that require EU legislation, such as the liberalisation of financial services. However, if the constitution succeeds in making the EU more transparent and efficient, Europe's leaders will have more time and energy for tackling economic problems.

Charles Grant is director of the Centre for European Reform, in London


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