Europe's new political flexibility by Steven Everts
August/September
2000 - CER BULLETIN, ISSUE 13
Europe's
new political flexibility Steven Everts
First Joschka Fischer
and then Jacques Chirac have sought to frame the terms of the debate on the
future of the EU. Mr Fischer's "centre of gravity" and Mr Chirac's
"pioneer group" are the subject of earnest discussion in think-tanks,
foreign ministries and newspaper columns. They have succeeded not only in making
people think about the institutional consequences of enlargement, but also it
seem - in reasserting the claims of France and Germany to lead the EU.
It is undoubtedly true that Paris and Berlin, after a couple of years of strained
relations, have worked hard to forge a common agenda for the current inter-governmental
conference (IGC). They have ensured, for example, that the IGC will tackle "flexibility"
(also know as "enhanced co-operation").
As far as large sections of the British press are concerned, an old pattern
is being repeated. France and Germany call the shots and Britain has to choose
between accepting their flawed designs for ever-closer union - or standing alone
in splendid isolation.
However, this picture is grossly exaggerated and misleading. IN recent years,
EU power politics has become more open and diversified. It is true that for
decades there was a boringly repetitive pattern. Leader from Paris and Bonn
would meet to hammer out common proposals for further European integration.
When reacting to such schemes, the British government would stress that they
were mostly hot air, probably unworkable and that in any case British priorities
were different.
The other European governments, in contrast, nearly always followed the Franco-German
lead. Despite reservations about particular aspects of the Paris-Bonn agenda,
countries such as Italy, the Netherlands and Spain usually gave their assent,
They reasoned that, in the last analysis, a franco-German Europe was better
than no Europe at all. This trend confirms the British suspicion that EU integration
was something thrust upon them, rather than a process they could help to shape.
But the truth is that France and Germany can no longer exert leadership across
the whole spectrum of EU politics. This is because the last EU enlargement brought
in countries such as Sweden, which do not believe that EU integration is, in
itself, a worthy political objective, Furthermore, Tony Blair's more constrictive
attitude towards the EU has helped to make Britain a serious player in EU politics.
But perhaps the most important factor has been the EU's expansion into new policy
fields. Issues such as foreign and security policy, defence cooperation, justice
and home affairs and economic reform are not as dominated by France and Germany
as - for example - the EMU debate once was.
It is striking how all EU member-states have become more "promiscuous"
in forming alliances inside the EU. Strategic alliances such as that between
France and Germany still have their value. But increasingly, who teams up with
whom depends on the subject in question. For example at last March's Lisbon
economic summit, Britain worked closely with Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and
Portugal to push through a raft of liberalising measures. On defence, Britain
and France have set the direction go the "St Malo initiative". The
biggest push to beef up the powers of the euro-11 committee has come from France,
Belgium and Italy, while Germany and the Netherlands remain cautious about building
it into an institution. On other dossiers, such as they withholding tax or energy
liberlaisation, the coalition patterns are different again.
This diversification
of EU politics should be welcomed. For the EU will surely work better if it
can draw upon the relative strengths and expertise of varying groups of member-states
to give a lead in different policy areas.
The EU's expansion to 27-plus member-states means that more "flexibility"
in institutional structures is inevitable. Of course, all member-states should
accept the acquis communautaire - even if East Europeans will be temporarily
excused from parts of it. But leadership and innovation in new areas of policy
will, increasingly, depend on smaller groups of countries rather than the full
complement of EU members. Not every country will wish to, or be allowed to,
take part in every policy area.
European leaders should recognise this new pluralism and accept its implications.
Coalitions of the willing and able should have the opportunity to agree on closer
co-operation within the treaty framework. The EU should therefore scrap the
existing "emergency brake" - the provision of the Amsterdam treaty
which allows any country to veto a group moving forwards with enhanced cooperation
Britain opposes lifting the emergency brake in the current IGC. But far from
fearing the greater flexibility, the British government should embrace it. The
government could play a key role in many areas of enhanced cooperation - especially
if it joined the euro. If the British refuse to lift the brake, they may well
increase the probability of flexibility happening outside the treaties - and
possibly in the form that Mr Blair fears most.
It would be ironic if, just when EU politics is opening up, British obstructionism
helped to created the very situation that Eurosceptics love to hate: sustained
Franco-German leadership over core Europe. The best way for Tony Blair to avoid
this scenario is to be bolder on the euro and more flexible on flexibility.
