To the second Bosphorus conference
organized by TESEV and the CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM
Istanbul, 14/15 October 2005

some key conclusions

The Bosphorous conference, October 14-15 2005, organised by TESEV, the Centre for European Reform and the British Council: some key conclusions

1. Some advice for Turkey, from those who have negotiated on behalf of countries joining the EU, and from senior Commission officials.
1) Take a positive attitude to the accession talks. Say that you want to get in and that you will do whatever is necessary. Don't be upset about the EU insisting on 'open-ended' talks: the process was also open for the Central and East Europeans, and in Turkey's case the EU governments have to stress this fact for home consumption. Do not threaten to walk away from the negotiations and spread doubts about their outcome - others will express such doubts for you. Let your opponents in Europe appear extreme, unreasonable and unconstructive.

2) Don't expect real 'negotiations'. The accession talks are about you adopting the acquis communautaire. Real negotiations will take place on perhaps 20% of the issues involved in EU accession - and most of these will only come up towards the end of the accession process. Also, don't ask for a precise accession date: you might not like the answer. Rather, define how long you will need to adopt the different parts of the acquis - and get on with adopting it, making as much progress as you can during negotiations.

3) Don't underestimate the importance of screening, the comparison of EU rules with Turkish laws. Some people in Turkey say: 'We've done that already', but the process is only just beginning and it will take at least a year. The Commission will prepare a report on each negotiating 'chapter', identifying what Turkey has to do. So Turkey will profit more from screening than the EU because it will find out where its main shortcomings are and what international best practice is.

4) Don't complain too much about the EU's decision to introduce benchmarks for the opening and closing of chapters in the accession talks. This idea is based on a Commission report on the lessons learnt from the last enlargement. With the East Europeans, there was not much consistency, and the closure of a chapter depended on political judgement rather than objective criteria. Turkey may be better off with objective benchmarks. In the case of Turkey, the opening of some chapters will be made dependent on progress in implementing existing commitment under the customs union, for example in pharmaceuticals.

5) Don't say that because Turkey is strategically more important than the East Europeans, it should be made a special case. Domestic politics in EU states will not allow you to be treated in a special way. Geostrategic advantages don't count much on the negotiating table; some will see them - for example, borders with unstable regions - as disadvantages. In any case, your best argument is that Turkey is a normal European country.

6) Do streamline your negotiation team. The current set-up, with the central secretariat having little sway over the relevant ministries and departments, is a recipe for infighting and delays. Too many agencies are involved and there is no clear hierarchy. Learn from the example of Hungary, which had the best negotiating structure of the East Europeans: the EU unit, under the foreign minister, had strong authority over the relevant ministries.

7) Don't wait until the EU presents you with a common negotiating position, before you react. Don't think negotiations only take place in 'Coreper', or the Council of Ministers, which only becomes involved at the very last stage. Try to influence EU governments, parliaments, NGOs and media before the EU comes up with a common position. But don't ask the Americans to help you influence the EU - that could prove counter-productive.

8) Do try to ensure that the whole of Turkish society is behind the goal of EU accession. Those East European countries that had a strong national consensus made the fastest progress. Just as EU politicians need to sell the benefits of Turkish enlargement to their voters, Turkish politicians need to sell those benefits to Turkish citizens.

9) Do try to polish Turkey's image in your dealings with the EU institutions and governments. Sometimes Turkey's politicians and diplomats appear to be uncompromising. Accession is a confidence-building process that creates mutual trust between the EU and the candidate. Bureaucracies have to talk to each other on a daily basis. Turkey needs to show that its administration is efficient and co-operative from the very start of accession talks - and so deprive some of those who oppose Turkish membership of anti-Turkish arguments. Also, Turkey should make sure that the EU never makes it an offer that it cannot accept. Instead, try to ensure that the most unpalatable or difficult proposals become stuck in the Brussels machinery.

10) Remember that you have to negotiate not only with the Commission and EU governments, but also with the peoples of the EU. So far, Turkey's public relations efforts have alternated between being non-existent and inept. You need a centrally-driven PR strategy, designed to win the hearts and minds of European citizens. This should involve key elements of Turkey's civil society, such as NGOs and business leaders, and include overseas embassies. A surprisingly large number of Turkey's critics have never visited the country. Spare no expense in inviting influential journalists, parliamentarians and leaders of NGOs to visit the country and meet senior Turks.

2. The difficult chapters to negotiate
There will be two types of difficult chapter:

A. Those that are technically difficult.

3. There was a consensus on the need for a new EU initiative on Cyprus
The EU needs to take a new initiative on unblocking the Cyprus problem. Turkey has done what was asked of it, and supported the Anan plan, but the EU has failed to deliver on its promises to Northern Cyprus, notably to end its isolation. Aid and the restoration of transport links have been blocked. Meanwhile people from Northern Cyprus are not represented anywhere in the political process of the EU. There is a structural problem: Nicosia has no incentive to negotiate a settlement, since it is in the EU and Turkey is not, and since it knows Turkey cannot join without recognising the current Cypriot regime. The Cyprus issue will adversely affect negotiations on chapters for transport, free movement and the customs union - and could cause a crisis as early as next year, when the EU expects Turkey to open its ports to Cypriot commerce.

Therefore the EU needs to launch an initiative to end the isolation of Northern Cyprus, immediately. Such an initiative needs to involve the Greek government, the US, Russia and the UN. The EU needs to get both sides to think in terms of 'win-win' solutions: for example Turkey would open its ports to Cypriot ships, but at the same time Cyprus would lift its blocking of direct flights between Northern Cyprus and the rest of the world.

4. A package deal on EU enlargement to the South East?
In the closing session, Carl Bildt suggested that the best way to sell Turkish accession to sceptical electorates would be to link it with the accession of the Western Balkans. Turkey and the remaining Balkan countries should join at the same time. Then voters in France and elsewhere would see that enlargement was about the extension of prosperity and stability across the whole continent, and they would see that it was about resolving deep-rooted conflicts (Croat-Serb, Greek-Turk, Serb-Albanian, etc). Those states which want to hold referendums on enlargement should not hold separate referendums on e.g. Turkey, Montenegro, Macedonia, and so on, but a single referendum on the whole package.

by Katinka Barysch and Charles Grant

Centre for European Reform © CER 2005