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Military skills key to European influence in US

18 July 2004

A new report from a British think tank says that to enhance their influence in Washington and the world, European governments need to improve their military capabilities and develop their own distinctive approach to warfare. That approach should build on core European military strengths related to postwar stabilization after a military conflict. These approaches include nation-building, peacekeeping and counter-insurgency warfare.
The United States also has much to learn from its European allies about these approaches, the report said, especially as both Europe and the United States work to stabilize, rebuild and establish democratic regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, the report suggests that Britain and France, Europe's leading military powers, lead by example in developing a European way of war and a common European approach to relations with the United States, based on partnership and autonomy. The report highlights the need for Europeans to retain the ability to work alongside U.S. military forces, which are becoming increasingly sophisticated technologically, because Europeans are not expected to undertake major military operations at the higher end of the conflict spectrum without the United States. The report further suggests that Europe develop military forces that complement those of the United States and reflect the changing nature of warfare. Toward that end, it says Europeans need better combat skills and equipment. It also recommends that the United States enhance capabilities related to the post-conflict period, or winning the peace, specifically by increasing the number of troops that are trained for peacekeeping and nation-building. European forces have more extensive experience than American forces in those tasks as a result of European colonialism and their recent nation-building efforts in the Balkans and elsewhere.

EU military operations
Last year, the European Union mounted its first military operations by working with NATO to enforce the peace in Macedonia, leading police missions in Bosnia and Macedonia, and undertaking its first independent, long-range military deployment, which was in the Congo.
At the end of this year, the EU will take over command of a large peacekeeping mission in Bosnia from NATO through an arrangement known as Berlin Plus, under which the EU can use NATO military assets. NATO, however, will retain a presence in this region after the handover.
NATO leaders agreed at a summit in Istanbul last month to train Iraqi security forces and to expand the alliance's peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.

EU leaders agreed on a constitutional treaty last month that aims, among other goals, to enhance the bloc's global profile by creating an EU president and foreign minister. They also agreed to create an EU diplomatic corps and an EU defense agency that will work to strengthen European military capabilities with better procurement decisions and increased resources for military research and development.
Moreover, EU leaders appointed Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Barroso as the next president of the European Commission and reappointed Javier Solana as EU foreign policy chief. Mr. Solana is expected to become the first foreign minister of the EU.

"A European Way of War," published by the Center for European Reform (CER), a London-based research institute that focuses on European integration, was prepared by six prominent defense analysts from both sides of the Atlantic. They include Michael O'Hanlon, an American defense expert at the Brookings Institution, and five Europeans. The Europeans include Charles Grant, director of the CER; Steven Everts, director of the CER's transatlantic program; and Daniel Keohane, a fellow at the CER.

The other European authors are Lawrence Freedman, one of Britain's best-known authorities on defense policy and a professor of war studies at King's College of Oxford University, and Francois Heisbourg, a prominent French defense expert who is director of the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research and chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

America as benchmark
These authors explain that U.S. military forces are widely viewed as the inevitable benchmark for assessing Europe's progress in enhancing its military power.

For example, military experts often note that Europeans collectively spend about two-thirds as much as the United States on defense but have only about one-tenth of the U.S. capacity for force projection and only half of the latter forces can be deployed rapidly. Such comparisons unfairly slight European military contributions, these experts said, because Europe has different strategic priorities from the United States and does not need, nor could it afford, to emulate the overwhelming U.S. military prowess.

The authors said that vast increases in defense spending, which in any case would be extremely unpopular among European citizens, are not necessary to enhance European military capabilities because the required capabilities can be developed by using existing funds more efficiently and by better allocating current resources instead of directing the bulk of them toward maintaining conscript armies.

Defense experts say that in addition to certain key capabilities that are lacking, such as improved communications and logistics, Europe needs additional professional military forces. Mr. Grant added that in some issues, such as air-to-ground cruise missiles and air-to-air missiles, European equipment is superior to that of the United States.

The British model

The British military provides a more suitable model for continental European militaries than does the U.S. military, said Mr. Freedman of Oxford. The British model, he said, is based primarily on the importance of separating insurgents from local populations and working closely with the locals.
Mr. Freedman called U.S. military doctrine "dysfunctional" because of the reluctance of U.S. military commanders to engage in the unconventional warfare associated with counterinsurgency and peace enforcement operations. U.S. concern about force protection, he said, "often leads to overreaction by [American] soldiers that pushes insurgents and locals together."

In recent months, British military commanders in Iraq reportedly have said that their American counterparts have used overly aggressive tactics against insurgents in Iraq, especially in Fallujah, which they say has heightened Iraqi concerns about the U.S. military presence. Mr. Freedman also suggested that a new war sequence has emerged as a result of Iraq and other recent conflicts, in which actual war-fighting ends relatively quickly because no enemy can match U.S. military power, but the post-conflict period can become almost indefinite. As a result, he added: "The key question is not whether the Europeans can adapt to American military doctrine but whether the Americans can adapt to the European way of war."

Division of labor
According to the conventional wisdom among defense experts, Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution explained, there is a division of labor in trans-Atlantic military operations in which the U.S. "cooks dinner" while Europeans "do the dishes." That analogy is a reference to how the United States dominates military campaigns because of its overwhelming military forces, but Europeans are often left to carry the largest peacekeeping burden because of their strengths in that task. As Mr. O'Hanlon said, "European soldiers are arguably better at peacekeeping than U.S. forces."

He rejected the notion that there is or should be a neat trans-Atlantic military division of labor, however, explaining that each side of the Atlantic needs both combat and peace enforcement capabilities. Mr. O'Hanlon also said the distinction between the combat and post-combat phases of military conflict is eroding because post-conflict stabilization can require high-intensity combat operations, as happened recently in Iraq. As he said: "Iraq has demonstrated that the U.S. needs to be good -- and indeed get better -- at post-conflict stabilization. He also suggested that European militaries use Britain as a model by developing "somewhat smaller professional forces that are well-provisioned logistically, even on a remote battlefield."

U.S. concerns
Ever since the EU began the drive to develop its own military forces in 1999, U.S. officials and commentators have raised two main concerns: that an independent European military might become a competitor to NATO and that the Europeans would duplicate what was done through NATO to enhance their military capabilities.

As Mr. Everts and Mr. Keohane explained in "A European Way of War," however, such concerns are largely misplaced: "The reality is the EU will not have its own army for decades to come -- if ever, nor will NATO's status as Europe's pre-eminent defense organization change any time soon.
"For most European defense ministries," they wrote, "NATO will continue to be the principal multinational military organization. That is not only because NATO is a military organization -- which the EU is not -- but also because of NATO's large and experienced military headquarters."
They also pointed out that NATO, rather than the EU, is currently providing the main impetus for reform of European military forces -- primarily through the NATO Response Force and the NATO command in Norfolk -- that promote trans-Atlantic military transformation.

European countries are developing military forces designed to enable them to keep up with the U.S. "revolution in military affairs," which uses digital technology to improve the battlefield assessments of military commanders. Moreover, EU officials frequently explain that European military forces are available for both NATO and EU missions and are intended for use when the United States decides not to participate. Most European countries belong to both organizations.

EU vs. NATO
In the past couple of decades, EU integration was dominated by efforts to create the euro and establish a single market, said Charles Grant, the CER director. "In the coming decades, it will be cooperation on justice and home affairs, and also on foreign and defense policy, that drives European integration."

"Justice and home affairs" refers to police and judicial cooperation and efforts to protect the EU's homeland security. EU countries have stepped up their efforts in those tasks since the March 11 terrorist attacks in Madrid, such as by appointing a terrorism policy czar, although they still have a long way to go to develop an effective antiterrorism strategy, according to the CER report.

Mr. Grant also discussed the differences between the EU and NATO, noting that, unlike NATO and other international organizations, the EU can draw on a unique combination of hard and soft power, or on "the military and civilian instruments for managing crises." As he explained, the lesson of recent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq is that hard power is sufficient to overthrow a regime, but stabilizing and rebuilding a country requires the use of soft power. Moreover, the main strengths of the EU, which until recently has been a civilian power, lie in the domain of soft power.

Mr. Grant also said that, although Europeans are criticized for being overly bureaucratic and for emphasizing institutions over capabilities, the NATO bureaucracy is substantially larger than the nascent EU military bureaucracy. NATO has a headquarters staff in Brussels of almost 20,000, but the embryonic EU defense agency has fewer than 300 staff.

Relations with Washington
The CER report concludes that the key issue in the European defense policy debate is what relationship to pursue with Washington. As Mr. Freedman of Oxford explained, Europe has two main approaches to relations with the U.S. -- the French and British perspectives: France believes that Europe should enhance its ability to act independently in the military realm to build Europe as a counterweight to the United States. Britain, in contrast, said Mr. Freedman, believes that by enhancing its military capabilities and pursuing a partnership with the United States, Europe stands a better chance of Washington's taking its views into account.

As Mr. Grant has argued elsewhere, the French are too quick to oppose the United States, but the British tend to support the United States reflexively. Moreover, as the report's authors noted, these internal European divisions substantially reduced European influence on recent world events.

Mr. Grant suggested that Europe, therefore, needs to reconcile the French and British approaches to the United States in order to develop coherent and unified foreign and defense policies. Toward that end, he favors "a stronger Europe that is usually supportive of U.S. policies but a Europe which can act autonomously, and which, on matters of vital importance, is capable of opposing the U.S." Both the new president of the European Commission, Mr. Barroso of Portugal, and the EU foreign policy chief, Mr. Solana of Spain, are considered pro-American leaders.