The fight against corruption and national
maladministration is currently very much on the minds of policy-makers in
Brussels. This is because the eurozone crisis and concerns over the rule of law
in newer EU members, including Bulgaria and Romania, make clear an embarrassing
truth about European integration. The EU is a joint law-making body, single
currency area and common travel zone where countries have often very different
attitudes towards public accountability, quality of administration and the
prevention of graft.
Corruption and the weakness of national institutions is a
scourge right across central, eastern and southern Europe, according to a
recent report by Transparency International (TI) [2]. The report measured the
‘national integrity’ of 25 EU countries, finding that “Greece, Italy, Portugal
and Spain have serious deficits in public sector accountability and deep-rooted
problems of inefficiency, malpractice and corruption, which are neither
sufficiently controlled nor sanctioned.” In addition, TI reports that positive
progress towards reform in newer member-states has slowed, and in some cases
reversed, since accession, particularly in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. But
Bulgaria and Romania remain the most corrupt.
Hitherto, officials accepted divergences in governing
standards in the EU as an unalterable fact of life, and certainly too difficult
to address in the ultra-politically correct world of ministerial meetings and
diplomatic working groups. But now the mismatch between national
administrations in ethics and efficiency is one of the most salient political
problems obstructing efforts to stabilise the euro, calm tensions within the
Schengen area of passport-free travel and restore the popularity of EU
enlargement in older member-states.
Poor public administration in Greece – in terms of its
budgetary reporting and refugee protection – is partly responsible for that
country’s tenuous position within both the euro and the Schengen areas. In
Bulgaria and Romania, corruption and low judicial standards remain a serious
source of concern five years after accession to the Union, damaging both
countries’ chances of joining Schengen as well as the credibility of the EU
enlargement process. And in Hungary, the government of Viktor Orban seems
determined to limit the freedom of the press and the independence of the
judiciary and the central bank, a nod towards authoritarianism hardly becoming
an EU member-state. (See the 2012 report [3] on media freedom and the rule of law in Hungary, by Freedom House, an NGO.)
What – if anything – can be done to address such issues
at European level? The EU has the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, under which candidates
for membership must have functioning market economies, observe the rule of law
and respect human rights. However, the European Commission’s leverage to police
these conditions mostly evaporates after the candidate joins the EU and gains
equality of status with other members. If a country later crosses the threshold
from merely corrupt and inefficient to despotic government, the EU’s treaties
allow for other member-states to suspend its voting rights. But this is seen as
a ‘nuclear’ option by European governments, designed as a deterrent rather than
a tool, given the implications involved for national sovereignty.
The Commission thinks that it can at least improve
efforts to fight graft with a new ‘EU anti-corruption report’ to be published
every two years from 2013. (Its officials estimate that corruption costs
member-states collectively around €120 billion a year.) Rather than rank
countries in order of their relative virtue, as Transparency International does
(see its annual ‘Corruption Perceptions Index [4]’), the Commission will focus
instead on issues such as public procurement where widespread corruption
negatively impacts the single market. The reports will not name and shame
specific countries. Nor are any sanctions envisaged for those national
administrations which fail to address persistent problems. Such initiatives are
worthy but lack teeth.
What the EU really needs is an ex post means to ensure
that member countries would still pass the Copenhagen criteria if they were to
re-apply for membership. In July, the Commission will report on how much
progress Bulgaria and Romania have made in efforts to counter corruption,
reform their judiciaries and tackle organised crime. This is the so-called
‘co-operation and verification mechanism’ (CVM) that the two countries
undertook to follow in return for EU membership. Politicians in Bucharest and
Sofia now chafe at being singled out for special treatment amongst their EU
counterparts and would dearly love to see the CVM discontinued after its
five-year anniversary next month. This is despite the fact that both countries
have failed to deliver fully on solemn promises of reform that they made in
2007.
Instead, EU leaders should agree in principle that any
member found to be in persistent breach of the Union’s commitment to the rule
of law and good governance could be subject to a CVM, rather than a suspension
of voting rights. If a majority of EU countries agree, the definition of such a
breach could include instances where corruption or maladministration has
threatened the stability of the euro or Schengen areas. And, unlike the current
situation with Bulgaria and Romania, the Commission should be able to impose
sanctions – such as the suspension of EU funds – when countries refuse to
discuss problems or make progress towards meeting certain benchmarks. Officials
should include this idea in proposals for a new ‘political union’ currently
being drawn up to stabilise the eurozone.
Governments – whatever their fears for the euro or free
movement – are likely to take a dim view of further Commission interference in
an area where national sensitivities could hardly run higher. Furthermore, a
country's level of tolerance for corruption and poor administrative practices
is deeply engrained in its culture, history and legal traditions. Real progress
is dependent on a cultural shift in what is popularly deemed as acceptable
behaviour in businesses, courts or the government in the country in question.
Such change takes time and bureaucratic sanctions imposed by the EU can play
only a complementary role.
Nevertheless, it is equally unlikely that voters will
accept closer political union without stronger EU tools to monitor the
performance of public administrations and address concerns over corruption and
low judicial standards in existing and future members.
Hugo Brady [1] is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform