Issue 48 - 2006

Issue 48 - 2006 spotlight image

Issue 48 June/July, 2006

Unblocking EU-NATO co-operation

External author(s): Daniel Keohane

Can we live with a nuclear Iran?

External author(s): Mark Leonard
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Daniel Keohane, Mark Leonard

Europe’s new division of labour

Europe’s new division of labour

Europe’s new division of labour

Written by Katinka Barysch, 01 June 2006

Are the British the new French?

Are the British the new French?

Written by Simon Tilford, 05 May 2009

by Simon Tilford

The British tend to deride France as a hopelessly statist, anti-entrepreneurial country full of bolshie workers intent on extracting disproportionate rewards for their labour and a state too weak to resist them. This characterisation is not wholly inaccurate. But the implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption is that the UK is everything that France is not. This is not the case.

In some respects, Britain now looks worse than France. For all its faults, France produces good public services and decent social outcomes, such as relatively low levels of poverty and high overall skills levels. Britain, by contrast, now combines a very big state, patchy public services, generally poor social outcomes and increasing barriers to wealth creation. This is a poisonous mixture. The situation can be rescued, but not without breaking some eggs.

The figures are arresting. Britain has gone from having one of the smallest states in the EU to one of the largest. In 2000, public spending accounted for 37% of GDP in the UK, just three percentage points above the US and a full 15 percentage points below France. By 2010 the OECD estimates that state spending will account for 49% of GDP in Britain, against 53% in France (52% in famously high-spending Sweden). Britain has already overtaken Germany and the Netherlands (44% and 46% respectively).

This unprecedented expansion of the British state would be less of problem if the UK now had Scandinavian (or even French) levels of public services or first-rate physical infrastructure. But improvements in British public services over the last ten years have been nowhere near big enough to justify the increase in expenditure. Most of the money has gone on increased employment and wages, rather than improvements in services. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the stranglehold that the unions have on the public sector, productivity has stagnated.

It is also notable that Britain’s welfare-state is not comparable to that of Germany or the Netherlands, let alone France or Sweden. Unlike in these countries, many of the ordinary Britons currently losing their jobs will receive only derisory sums in unemployment benefits because these are means-tested. And only a forensic scientist could spot significant improvements in the country’s physical infrastructure. Britain’s roads remain as congested as ever and its railways expensive and unreliable.

Of course, the tax burden in the UK is still lower than in France. In 2008, taxes accounted for 49% of GDP in France compared to just 42% in Britain. But the gap between tax and expenditure in Britain is completely unsustainable, given the parlous state of the country’s public finances. How it is closed will to a large extent determine Britain’s economic prospects. If the gap is bridged by cutting expenditure, the UK stands a chance of returning to a relatively strong growth path. But if it is closed primarily through increased taxes, Britain will have a bleak future. The tax burden will be among the highest in the OECD, but public services (and the country’s social outcomes) will be nowhere near good enough to justify the tax take. In short, Britain will have Scandinavian levels of taxation and American levels of public services and social welfare.

The Labour party is poorly placed to sort out this mess because of its close links to the public sector unions. Under Labour the public sector has become a privileged class that is impervious to change and reform. By way of illustration, public sector wages are currently rising by close to 4% a year at a time of economic crisis. And this despite the fact that public workers are on average better paid than their private sector counterparts and enjoy generous pension entitlements. What about the country’s physical infrastructure? On the government’s forecasts, public investment will halve over the next 4 years. In fact, the only significant cuts the government intends to make are to investment.

The Tories stand a better chance of taking on entrenched public sector vested interests, but it will be a battle. Moreover, they will need to avoid the mistakes of the 1980s when they reduced spending by cutting services and investment rather than by increasing public sector efficiency. If they do this again, UK taxes will remain very high relative to what those taxes deliver in terms of services.

Britain still has strengths, of course. It is straightforward to set up a business in the UK and the labour market remains flexible. But overall Britain looks increasingly like one of the sick men of Europe, and certainly as sick as France. The French state is an efficient provider of services and quasi-state institutions construct and manage first-rate physical infrastructure. France, unlike Britain, has bitten the bullet on public pensions, increasing the retirement age to 65. The French have no qualms about allowing private companies to provide healthcare. Even the Tories do not appear to have the stomach for dismantling the NHS’s near monopoly on the provision of public healthcare.

The British need to get over the idea that they took all the difficult decisions in the 1980s and that Britain is an example for others to follow. It has a huge state, yet has poor social outcomes. Much of its growth in recent years has been down to a turbo-charged financial services industry and an unsustainable expansion of the public sector. Both trends have now run their course and the public sector has become a dead weight on the economy. Britain needs to concentrate on improving the climate for wealth creation. This will require much better public sector productivity and high levels of investment in human capital and physical infrastructure.

Simon Tilford is chief economist at the Centre for European Reform.

Comments

Added on 05 May 2009 at 14:05 by anonymous

Very nice piece but can we expect a sequel on how to increase public sector productivity?

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Launch of 'The Lisbon scorecard VIII'

Launch of 'The Lisbon scorecard VIII'

09 April 2008

Speakers included: Jean-Pierre Jouyet, French secretary of state for European affairs, Ann Mettler, The Lisbon Council, John Peet, Jean Pisani-Ferry & Philip Whyte.

Location info

Paris

Launch of CER report 'The Lisbon scorecard VIII'

Launch of CER report 'The Lisbon scorecard VIII'

03 March 2008

Speakers included: The Rt Hon John Hutton MP, secretary of state for business, enterprise and regulatory reform (BERR), Marco Annunziata, Stephanie Flanders, Wolfgang Münchau & Simon Tilford.

Location info

London

Launch of CER report 'The Lisbon scorecard VIII'

Launch of CER report 'The Lisbon scorecard VIII'

10 March 2008

Speakers included: José Manuel Barroso, president, European Commission, C. Boyden Gray, US Mission to the EU, Daniel Gros, John Monks & Katinka Barysch.

Location info

Brussels

The Lisbon scorecard IV: The status of economic reform in the enlarging EU

The Lisbon scorecard IV: The status of economic reform in the enlarging EU

The Lisbon scorecard IV: The status of economic reform in the enlarging EU

External Author(s)
Aladair Murray

Written by Aladair Murray, 05 March 2004

Business leaders risk discrediting markets

Business leaders risk discrediting markets

Written by Simon Tilford, 13 May 2010

by Simon Tilford

Despite their battered reputation, markets remain the best way of generating economic growth. But the market economy faces a crisis of legitimacy brought about by rising inequality and a breakdown of the relationship between risk and reward. The promise of capitalism is that wages rise in line with productivity growth. But over the last 15 years a hugely disproportionate share of the rewards from economic growth has accrued to those at the top, led by boardroom executives and senior bankers. By contrast, median incomes have stagnated. As a result, governments will struggle to convince electorates of the case for markets and free enterprise, and will have a tough time slimming down bloated public sectors.

One reason for the rise in inequality is falling demand for unskilled labour. Technological change and growing trade with emerging economies means that there is little demand for poorly-skilled workers. It is no surprise that the widening of wage differentials has been most pronounced in those European countries with large numbers of poorly-skilled workers. However, the rise in inequality also reflects a surge in what economists call ‘rent-seeking’: the ability of certain groups within society to extract disproportionate rewards (or ‘rents’) for their work.

Boardroom pay has ballooned across Europe, inflating wage differentials. According to Income Data Services, the executives of the UK’s 100 biggest companies earned 84 times the average pay of a full-time worker in 2009, up from 47 times in 2000. This trend is not confined to countries that are considered to be ‘economically-liberal’ such as the UK. It is happening across Europe. The dramatic rise in boardroom pay does not reflect share performance. Nor does it result from the fact that companies are competing for global talent: the overwhelming proportion of senior executives in all European countries are recruited nationally.

Another group to have attracted outsized rewards is employed in the financial services industry. Pay in the financial sector has risen far more rapidly than across the economy as a whole. But as Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England has convincingly demonstrated, the huge rise in the sector’s profitability and the subsequent growth in remuneration was the product of leverage – increased borrowing – and not an improved return on assets. The latter requires skill, the former does not. To make matter worse, the losses incurred by the banks when their excessive leverage provoked the financial crisis were covered by the taxpayer. In short, the banks were able to privatise the rewards while socialising the losses. Their subsequent return to profitability owes much to intervention of governments.

The exaggerated remuneration of top bankers and senior executives is essentially a form of rent-seeking. In essence, it is little different from public sector unions securing pay increases in excess of productivity growth or organised special interest groups defending social rights – unfunded pension liabilities, for example – that can only be exercised at the expense of others. The popular perception of business as a vehicle for ‘rent extraction’ rather than a source of employment, wealth and tax revenue is poisonous for the political economy of reform.

Rising inequality did not matter so much when economies were growing and public finances were manageable. But it does now. European governments face mighty challenges. They have to persuade sceptical electorates of the need for more flexible labour markets; the curtailment of social rights; a greater role for the private sector in areas currently dominated by the state; and even cuts in public services. But how can governments succeed in doing this if such reforms are blamed for rising inequality and for allowing unwarranted personal enrichment? Put another way, how can governments address rent-seeking by other powerful groups in society, such as the public sector unions, in the face of rent-seeking by those in the financial sector and on company boards?

The rise in income inequality needs to be reversed and the relationship between risk and reward restored if governments are to be able to sell market-led reforms to increasingly (and understandably) cynical electorates. Governments have to be able to demonstrate how people benefit from markets. They have to be able to show that markets prevent groups within society from extracting undue rewards, not abet them in their drive to do so. For their part, the leaders of finance and business need to recognise that their remuneration is an obstacle to the kinds of market-led reforms they themselves advocate and which are needed to boost economic performance.

Simon Tilford is chief economist at the Centre for European Reform

Growing old gracefully: How to ease population ageing in Europe

Growing old gracefully

Growing old gracefully: How to ease population ageing in Europe

External Author(s)
Alasdair Murray

Written by Alasdair Murray, 17 January 2008

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Breakfast meeting on 'Is Europe going bust: the impact of demographic decline and the fiscal crisis?'

Breakfast meeting on 'Is Europe going bust: the impact of demographic decline an

Breakfast meeting on 'Is Europe going bust: the impact of demographic decline and the fiscal crisis?'

16 June 2009

With David Willetts MP, shadow secretary of state for innovation, universities & skills.

Location info

London
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