Unblocking EU-NATO co-operation

Unblocking EU-NATO co-operation

Unblocking EU-NATO co-operation

External Author(s)
Daniel Keohane

Written by Daniel Keohane, 01 June 2006

Britain and France must pool parts of their defence

Britain and France must pool parts of their defence

Britain and France must pool parts of their defence

External Author(s)
Edgar Buckley

Written by Edgar Buckley, 01 August 2006

Can Europeans share a common security culture?

Can Europeans share a common security culture?

Can Europeans share a common security culture?

Written by Clara Marina O'Donnell, 27 July 2009

by Clara Marina O'Donnell

European countries have long declared their ambition to turn the EU into a global player in security – in order to tackle common threats and strengthen their voice on the global stage. But they still cannot agree on the main threats to their security or the best way to tackle them. Their views are so diverse that it is a wonder EU countries have managed to agree on any common action at all. But member-states need to strengthen their efforts to develop a common approach to security if the EU is to become a serious player.

For the past two decades, the EU has been developing a profile in foreign and security policy. It has agreed common security strategies, deployed over 20 peacekeeping and crisis management missions, led negotiations with Iran on the latter’s nuclear programme and negotiated a ceasefire to the Russia-Georgia war. However, as was brought into focus at a recent EUISS seminar, EU countries do not always share the same threat perceptions, or agree how these should be tackled.

Some European countries, such as Ireland and Austria, do not believe they face any serious ‘hard’ threats. Others fear for their territorial integrity, including the Baltics, Poland and the Czech Republic. Greeks and Cypriots worry mainly about the prospect of renewed military conflict with Turkey. So while Cyprus is still partly militarily occupied and Greek and Turkish military aircraft tail each other on a daily basis, the Viennese worry mainly about the level of burglaries in their city.

While the UK considers the threat of transnational terrorism as the most pressing threat to Europe as a whole, and a key priority to be tackled at home and abroad, most other countries feel largely unaffected. Russia is seen as a close partner to some countries, including Italy and Germany, while the Baltic states see it as an existential threat. Some member-states believe it is important to have a global outlook on security, in particular France and the UK, while others, such as Malta, believe their main security challenge is managing migration flows.

Different views also exist on how to tackle security threats. For many member-states a UN mandate is essential in order to participate in a military mission abroad, while for others, like the UK, it is only desirable. Some believe the US and NATO are cornerstones of their security (in particular the UK and the eastern countries), while others view NATO with suspicion – and resent the UK for having sided with the US during the war in Iraq. Some EU member-states have long traditions of intervention in conflicts across the world and accept the possibility of casualties within their armed forces, in particular France and the UK. Others are averse to the use of military force, most notably Germany.

Various member-states (Sweden, Austria, Finland and Ireland) have a long history of neutrality and are grappling to make their stance compatible with growing EU co-operation in security and defence (Ireland is finding it the hardest to accept EU defence co-operation. Due to public concern, it will have its military neutrality enshrined in an EU treaty for the first time if the Lisbon treaty comes into force). For their part, the UK and France are insistent on the need to develop expeditionary capabilities to allow the EU to fulfil its ambitions abroad. Some member-states, such as Sweden, have transformed their military forces, but many others have so far resisted.

In light of their very different histories, traditions and cultures, it is no mean achievement that EU countries have agreed to work together to provide peacekeeping and crisis management to conflicts zones in need, and to cooperate on wider security issues such as Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, with time the EU is likely to become further involved in security, by tackling ‘soft’ threats (such as protective measures against cyber attacks), or certain aspects of ‘hard’ threats (such as monitoring the cross-border transfer of dangerous products which could be used in chemical or biological attacks).

But member-states’ different interests and approaches limit the EU’s effectiveness as an external actor, as demonstrated by the difficulties in finding helicopters for the EU’s peacekeeping mission to Chad, the UK’s refusal to send a battlegroup to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008, or the difficulties the EU has in agreeing a common position on Russia or energy security.

Perhaps the biggest problem for the EU is the division between its western and eastern members. While many member-states feel they cannot trust their partners to guarantee their security (within the EU or NATO), it is difficult to talk of a common security culture. If threat perceptions within eastern European countries worsened, their anxieties could define their foreign policies, hampering the EU’s work at home and abroad (and NATO). For the EU and NATO to remain credible security providers to their members, and for the EU to become a serious player in global security, European countries must overcome the current mistrust and strengthen their efforts to develop a stronger common strategic culture.

Clara Marina O'Donnell is a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform

Comments

Added on 30 Jul 2009 at 20:28 by Anonymous

Yes, it is called obeying to human rights. That is the base for all security, not repression that usually create unsecurity.

Like this: I do not like my neighbour, he might hurt me, so i better punish him on beforehand, for the sake of security.

Anyone can see that that kind of thinking does not lead to security, that leads to the abolishion of the presumtion of innocense, and the use of preemtive strikes.

So, of course we all can share a common security culture. But that culture is only possible as long as it doesent is based on aboshing the values the security is there to protect. There are never any balancing act to do between between basic free and liberties, never. People have died in masses to gain those rights, security is not worth a cent in comparison. Security is the first thing traded away for any people trying to gain those rights.

And BTW, do you learn how to handle risk by avoiding? Thats right, you do not. That is the way to be incompetent in risk management and beginning to trade liberty with security, wich only can feel comfortable a short moment.

Do not fall in the trap of politics of fear. Scared people are dangerous people, especially those with power or weapons in their hands, or both god forbid. Nightmares are not more true than other dreams, but actions based on fear differ very much from those based on visions.

- Magnus

Roundtable on 'The EU, NATO and the future of European defence'

Roundtable on 'The EU, NATO and the future of European defence'

Roundtable on 'The EU, NATO and the future of European defence'

14 February 2008

Speakers included: François Heisbourg, Lord Robertson & Kori Schake.

Location info

London

Fighting the leaderless jihad

Fighting the leaderless jihad

Fighting the leaderless jihad

Written by Hugo Brady, 01 March 2009
From E!Sharp

NATO, Russia and European security

NATO, Russia and European security

NATO, Russia and European security

External Author(s)
Tomas Valasek

Written by Tomas Valasek, 06 November 2009

Britain explores sharing defence equipment with Europe

Britain explores sharing defence equipment with Europe

Britain explores sharing defence equipment with Europe

Written by Clara Marina O'Donnell, 15 February 2010

by Clara Marina O'Donnell

With its public finances under growing strain, Britain may soon be forced to look at saving defence costs by pooling its military assets with those of its allies. The decision will not be taken until after the next general election (which will probably be held in May 2010). In the meantime, however, the issues at stake have been set out in a report published by the ministry of defence on February 3rd.

The ministry of defence’s green paper lays out the main questions for the forthcoming strategic defence review. It is the first British government document to put such a strong emphasis on exploring the possibilities for integrating defence forces amongst allies. The proposals reflect the extent of the financial constraints on the British defence budget. Indeed, the report warns that the UK “cannot proceed with the activities and programmes [it] currently aspires to, while simultaneously supporting [its] current operations and investing in the new capabilities [it] needs.” While restating the importance of bilateral relations with the US, the paper also, unusually, highlights the possibility of pooling assets and specialising in certain equipment within the EU, in addition to NATO.

Because of smaller defence budgets, other European countries have already had to start integrating capabilities and specialising. The Czechs notably have chosen to focus on developing expertise against chemical and biological warfare. But to date Britain has been able to maintain the full spectrum of capabilities autonomously and only shares common equipment for space. (The UK is also somewhat dependent on the US for its nuclear deterrent, because it uses US technology.)

Over the last decades, the only cooperative efforts in which Britain has participated have been joint programmes to develop equipment which Britain has then owned nationally. For example, during the Cold War, the UK teamed up with France to develop the Jaguar aircraft and a series of helicopters, and it worked with Germany and Italy to develop the Tornado aircraft. Today, Britain, Germany and Spain are developing the Eurofighter and the UK is part of the European effort to build the A400M military aircraft. Britain is also a leading partner in the transatlantic initiative to build the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. And through the EU’s European Defence Agency, the UK takes part in efforts to explore further common procurement programmes.

The CER has long argued that Britain could increase the cost-effectiveness of its defence procurement by working more closely with its allies – be it through sharing assets or less ambitiously through more co-operation on logistics and training. For some collaborative efforts, working through NATO or the EU can be a useful umbrella (such as conducting research for a next generation of unmanned air vehicles). A large group of countries will provide larger funds and ensure more defence ministries adopt the capabilities developed. This in turn strengthens interoperability and increases the amount of capabilities across Europe. But large groups of countries also make cooperative efforts more cumbersome. So for big ticket items, like aircraft carriers, it makes more sense for Britain to explore possible synergies with only one or two likeminded countries. France is an obvious partner with whom to explore sharing assets. It is the only other country in Europe to have maintained a full spectrum of capabilities and it has a defence budget similar to the UK’s. (While the US is Britain’s closest ally, it is not under the same pressure to pool resources because of its large defence budget.)

If Britain were to pool assets or rely more on allies to provide certain capabilities, its autonomy could be affected – if Britain and France shared a fleet of carriers, France might not agree to send them on a mission to which Britain wanted to contribute. But faced with the prospect of having to abandon some capabilities completely, sharing appears less daunting. (For more on the benefits and costs of pooling assets, see Clara Marina O’Donnell, Britain must pool defence capabilities,CER bulletin October/November 2009.)
http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/68_odonnell.html

To what extent might a Labour or Conservative government explore the possibilities of deeper co-operation with various allies in the forthcoming strategic defence review. The fact that the current government has presented the green paper is an encouraging sign, and more than one defence minister has voiced interest in re-exploring collaborations with the French on aircraft carriers.

The Conservative shadow cabinet supports closer collaboration on capabilities with certain allies, in particular the US and France. Conservatives are less keen on strengthening defence co-operation within the EU. Shadow Secretary of State for defence Liam Fox still toys with the idea of withdrawing Britain from the European Defence Agency, if the Conservatives win the next elections.

It would be unfortunate if a Conservative government withdrew from closer EU defence co-operation. Britain stands to benefit from collaborative efforts under the EDA’s umbrella, not least because it can be used to encourage other European countries to develop some badly needed equipment, including for Afghanistan. In addition, France might be less keen to work bilaterally with the UK on big ticket items, if London undermines EU defence efforts in which Paris has invested much political capital over the last decade.

Britain has dared to ask itself the right questions, now it must explore the answers. The defence review will force the UK to reflect on the role it wants to play in the world and how it develops the means to play that role. The next government should explore all avenues of co-operation, from shared maintenance to pooling assets, and it should explore them with all its allies – be it bilaterally, particularly with France, or through NATO and the EU. Such co-operation might somewhat reduce Britain’s autonomy, but it might be the only option for the UK to remain a global player.

Clara Marina O'Donnell is a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.

Comments

Added on 21 Apr 2010 at 09:13 by Anonymous

If delivering useful military capabilities whilst maximising the effectiveness of military expenditure is the aim the UK will have to be pragmatic. Collaborative opportunities will exist where there are common military capability requirements, common equipment and a shared political vision. Many of these opportunities will exist with European partners. The UK needs to focus on the business case for collaboration not the institutions; remembering that over dependence on the US is unlikely to be a successful strategy for controling procurement costs in the long term.

Added on 13 Mar 2010 at 17:26 by Anonymous

International collaboration on defence equipment is an area where history shows that theory and reality diverge uncomfortably rapidly. In any collaboration both unity of purpose and focus are needed, and experience indicates that the addition of each new partner nation brings both diminishing returns and added complexity. In many respects France is now the only European nation worth partnering with on big procurement projects, and the problems inherent in multilateral programmes may well see the MoD focussing far more on bilateral collaborations, to the detriment of wider European multilateral cooperation. Moreover, there are signs that even France is assessing that its promotion of European multilateral activity is becoming both increasingly unrealistic and represents a misdirection of effort. After France, it would not be a surprise for the MoD to assess that partnering with like-minded Australia and Canada is more likely to make sense than broader European collaboration. The experience of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in stimulating international collaboration, and of OCCAR in managing it, is not encouraging. In particular the former of these two organisations has yet to attain the necessary confidence of national defence ministries and is unlikely ever to possess the skills needed to make a real strategic impact; it is now widely seen as more of a burden than a help. In an era of increasing budgetary pressure the UK may well decide that leaving the EDA will allow it to focus its collaborative activities more effectively.

Added on 04 Mar 2010 at 13:22 by giovanni brauzzi

I am afraid you forgot to mention Italy among the Eurofighter partners.

Added on 15 Feb 2010 at 16:04 by Anonymous

Sharing the cost of developing, producing and supporting new equipment is sensible and the potential savings make it worth accepting the downsides of compromise on specification and loss of programme flexibility. But the budgetary problem faced now by the MOD, which of course will get much worse over the next few years, means that capabilities will have to be given up (or not acquired, for instance force projection by means of strike carriers). The UK really cannot continue pretending it can support the full range of military capabilities.

What should NATO’s new strategic concept say about Russia?

What should NATO’s new strategic concept say about Russia?

What should NATO’s new strategic concept say about Russia?

Written by Tomas Valasek, 09 March 2011

by Tomas Valasek

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO has strived to reduce mutual suspicions with Russia and to build a more co-operative relationship. So it is vexing that 20 years on, Russia continues to view NATO as a hostile alliance. Moscow competes with NATO for influence in Eastern Europe, it seeks to halt NATO’s eastward enlargement and its recent security proposals for a new European security architecture were aimed in part at weakening NATO's role in European security. Moscow’s policy worries the Central European members of NATO, who have been demanding that the alliance draft defensive plans for the unlikely, but not unthinkable, possibility of a conflict with Russia.

The alliance's new strategic concept - its key guiding document, an update of which is due in the autumn – will not fundamentally change Russia's views. But many speakers at a recent seminar which the CER co-organised with NATO's public diplomacy division concluded that the document could be instrumental in unifying the allies' views on Russia, and in clarifying NATO's intentions towards Moscow.

The document should make two important points regarding Russia, several speakers argued. The first message is one of reassurance to the Central and Eastern European members of NATO who worry about Russia, especially after the war in Georgia in 2008. Their anxieties are eroding solidarity in NATO. Some are seeking bilateral security assurances from Washington in the form of US bases on their territory - but this would leave the 'have-nots' more vulnerable than the ‘haves’. It would therefore be better if the strategic concept sent a clear message that the alliance's mutual defence clause – Article V – remains as valid as ever. NATO should also underpin this message with the minimum necessary military planning and exercises.

The second message concerns Russia itself. No NATO ally wishes a conflict with Russia – least of all those on the alliance's eastern fringes, who know they would be more secure if Russia enjoyed a co-operative relationship with NATO. The alliance has repeatedly made this point in its communiqués, to little avail. But some speakers at the CER seminar argued that NATO should try again, and that this time the allies should go for a full ‘reset’: that is, tell Moscow that NATO is open to Russian membership, should it decide to join and meet the accession criteria. This would allow the Russian military – historically focused on a possible conflict with the West but now in the midst of deep reforms – to pay greater attention to the far more real threat of terrorism on its southern border, in the North Caucasus. It would also strengthen the hand of those in the Russian government who argue for an economic and political modernisation of Russia and for a closer relationship with the West.

In essence, NATO would follow a two-pronged approach: showing strength and solidarity vis-à-vis Russia but, at the same time, sending a message of inclusiveness to Moscow. The idea is not novel; the alliance pursued a similar ‘dual track’ approach for most of the 1970s and 1980s. But would it work in this day and age? Can the twin messages of reassurance and reset be reconciled?

Several speakers at the CER seminar argued for a positive answer, though they acknowledged the difficulties. The Russian government would view any new reassurance measures such as military exercises in Central Europe as a sign of ill intent. That would weaken the effect of any positive words the strategic concept may have for Russia.

Other speakers emphasised that reassurance measures should calm the relationship. By increasing solidarity among the allies, NATO would take away the opportunities – and the incentives - for the Russian government to pit one NATO member against another, as it has been doing in recent years. Moreover, reassurance measures would make the new allies feel more secure and therefore more willing to support a bold new outreach to Russia. Reassurance, several speakers said, is a precondition for reset.

Would a message of inclusion change Russia’s view of NATO? It is a tall order: the newly released Russian military doctrine calls the enlargement of NATO the most significant danger to the country's security. The Russians seem more and more concerned about NATO; the number of those worried about a conflict with ‘a major country’ – presumably western – has increased 12 per cent year-on-year in 2010 in one respected poll (though this could also reflect rising anxiety about China).

NATO’s ability to change this mindset is limited. The alliance carries so many negative associations in Russia that its capacity to aggravate tensions far outweighs its ability to induce positive change in Russian thinking. Nor is it obvious that the current government in Moscow is unhappy with the current situation – as one speaker at the seminar suggested, it suits some Russian elites to paint NATO as an enemy: doing so stimulates nationalist sentiment that may strengthen public support for the government.

Even so, a clear offer of reset from NATO could bring long-term benefits. The economic crisis has made Russia less certain and self-assured. While the regime is too inflexible to change in the short term (as Katinka Barysch argues in her recent CER policy brief http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/pb_eu_russia_22feb10.pdf), it also seems more introspective than at any time since the boom years of the mid to late 2000s. As Dmitri Trenin argues in his recent study http://http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/briefings/engaging_russia.pdf today’s bluster often hides uncertainty about the country’s economic and political future.

To overcome the mistrust between NATO and Russia, the country’s leaders would have to rethink some of the most fundamental bases of their foreign policy. NATO by itself cannot bring about that change. But it can create space for Russia’s independent thinkers and for the more reform-minded parts of the government to entertain the possibility of a future without a hostile relationship with the West. That could be a significant benefit of NATO’s new strategic concept carrying a message of reset.

Tomas Valasek is director of foreign policy and defence at the Centre for European Reform.

Comments

Added on 09 Mar 2010 at 16:58 by Rodric Braithwaite

I don't disagree with much of this. In particular some way needs to be found of making the alliance look militarily credible to the small eastern members, preferably without driving the Russians insane with suspicion. That will of course be very difficult indeed to do, but it is necessary if NATO is to retain (or regain) any credibility as a military alliance. Talking about Article 5 is not good enough: we all know what happened to Article 5 in September 2001.

But like many such papers, this one suffers from its inability to think itself into the Russian point of view. The Russians are not irrational. The expansion of NATO to Russia's borders would be regarded even by a non-paranoid Russian general staff as a major military threat, even if a very remote one That is no more irrational than for the Poles to believe that the Russians may one day invade them again. The bitter historical memories on BOTH sides have to be appreciated and dealt with

Nor is it good enough to say that the Russian proposal for a European security architecture is an attempt to split NATO. There may be an element of that. But it is primarily an attempt to achieve something to which we have always refused to respond: to get the rest of Europe to accept that Russia has a legitimate interest in the problems of European security, and the right to a significant voice. The problem with such Russian initiatives is that they have always - since the nineteenth century - been lacking in serious detail, partly because the Russians themselves don't know what they really want.

We can reject the Russian position if we like - we are perfectly entitled to do so. But then we mustn't be surprised at the consequences.

In general we still make the mistake, so absurdly prevalent in the 1990s, of telling the Russians that we know better than they do what their interests are. They may be wrong. But it is for them to judge.

Pressing the reset button is much too simple and crude a metaphor: it is even more lacking in content than the Russian proposal on European security. In any case, NATO speaks with a forked tongue. on the one hand we tell the Russians NATO is nothing for them to worry about. On the other we tell ourselves that it is an insurance against a resurgence of Russian power. We can't have it both ways.

How to make Europe's military work

How to make Europe's military work

How to make Europe's military work

Written by Charles Grant, 16 August 2009
From Financial Times

Preparing for the multipolar world: European foreign and security policy in 2020

Preparing for the multipolar world

Preparing for the multipolar world: European foreign and security policy in 2020

External Author(s)
Tomas Valasek

Written by Tomas Valasek, Charles Grant, 18 December 2007

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