Willing and able? EU defence in 2020

Willing and able? EU defence in 2020

Willing and able? EU defence in 2020

External Author(s)
Daniel Keohane, Tomas Valasek

Written by Daniel Keohane, Tomas Valasek, 02 June 2008

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Dinner on 'NATO and transatlantic relations'

Dinner on 'NATO and transatlantic relations'

Dinner on 'NATO and transatlantic relations'

14 September 2009

With Ivo Daalder, US permanent representative to NATO.

Location info

London
United Kingdom

EU must co-ordinate its defence needs

EU must co-ordinate its defence needs

EU must co-ordinate its defence needs

Written by Clara Marina O'Donnell, 15 August 2010
From The Guardian

Membership for Russia a step too far for NATO?

Membership for Russia a step too far for NATO?

Membership for Russia a step too far for NATO?

Written by Tomas Valasek, 08 July 2010

by Tomas Valasek

There are growing signs that Russia’s relations with NATO are on the mend. Senior Russian thinkers, some close to the government, have been cautiously talking up the possibility of Russia joining the alliance, as have several western officials and think-tanks (including the CER.) While some powerful forces in Russia continue to view NATO as a hostile force, the latest signs from Moscow are encouraging. But even assuming that the more pro-western forces within Russia prevail, membership of NATO will remain at best a long-term goal. In the short and medium term, Russia and NATO need to put considerable effort into reducing mistrust.


A group of prominent Russian thinkers recently invited their western counterparts to talk about the possibility of Russia joining NATO. What prompted this initiative is not obvious, but the atmospherics have clearly changed. Russia is being nicer to its neighbours, while a number of European countries – including those in Central and Eastern Europe – are being nicer to Moscow. NATO has effectively put enlargement on hold. Barack Obama’s ‘reset’ seems to be changing attitudes on all sides. The challenge before Russia and NATO is to try to turn this opportunity into a lasting improvement in relations.

The allies are not of one mind on the subject of Russian membership of the alliance. But conversations with NATO officials and diplomats suggest that NATO could be ready by its November summit to offer Moscow the possibility of joining, if and when the latter meets accession criteria. With additional persuasion – though this is more questionable – NATO may even create a special accession track for Russia, different from the one NATO used for previous candidates, so that Moscow feels that it is being treated like a great power. But the allies’ bottom line is that, one way or another, Moscow will need to adopt many of NATO’s norms, including those on democracy and transparency, before it can become a member.

Those Russians who want to explore the possibility of accession seem to have a different approach in mind. They are looking for a bargain of sorts with NATO. The alliance would promise not to enlarge eastward or arm regimes deemed unfriendly by Russia. Moscow would gain a veto over alliance decisions on matters which may affect Russia. In exchange, NATO would get better co-operation from Russia on things like missile defence or Afghanistan. NATO’s rules or norms do not seem to be a part of the bargain. Tellingly, few Russians use the term ‘membership’ with regard to NATO. They talk either of ‘integration’ or ‘organisational unity’. The former implies that both sides adopt some of the other side’s rules; the latter implies that neither side compromises internally. Either model is distant from what NATO has in mind.

But if membership is not the right thing for NATO and Russia to focus on in the near term, are there other viable ways to improve co-operation in the next few months and years? One Russian speaker at the meeting in Moscow put forth a possible solution. Instead of exploring membership, NATO and Russia should ‘demilitarise’ their relationship. Moscow would stop holding exercises that simulate a war with NATO, like the ‘Zapad’ exercise last year, in which 12,500 Russian and Belorusian troops repelled a fictitious attack from NATO. Russia would also change its strategic documents to make clear that NATO is not a ‘threat’ or ‘danger’. NATO would respond in kind, with no exercises and no new bases near Russia’s borders. If demilitarisation is successful, the theory goes, NATO and Russia would gradually come to view each other as partners. And that could open doors to even closer forms of co-operation in the future.

This is a sensible idea but not without difficulties. For a start, is Russia ready? The government is sending out mixed signals. Besides being nicer to its neighbours lately, Moscow has also launched sweeping defence reforms. These will change the Russian military from a grand force built to fight NATO into a smaller but more agile army better suited for regional conflicts like the one in Chechnya. That is good news for NATO. But only last year the Russian government also agreed a new military doctrine, which calls NATO’s activities the greatest danger to Russian security. So there is presumably a large segment of the Russian establishment that would oppose closer ties with the alliance.

In order to take up demilitarisation, NATO would have to be convinced that Russia is equally serious. Just as important, this initiative would need to win the support of the new allies in Central and Eastern Europe. Some of them feel that NATO has been neglecting the possibility of a conflict in Europe, and they want the alliance to adopt new ‘reassurance’ measures. These would involve, among other things, the creation of a new centre at NATO tasked with keeping an eye on future crises, including those involving Russia.

Some in NATO will argue that ‘reassurance’ would kill the hopes of a rapprochement with Russia, by provoking Moscow. But in fact the opposite is the case: without reassurance NATO will not reach the consensus it needs to offer Russia a new relationship – whether it means demilitarisation or, in the long run, integration. The right approach for NATO is to rebuild trust among the allies through reassurance while striving to reform its relationship with Russia. ‘Demilitarisation’ sounds like a useful idea to explore. The new allies should be supportive: after all, they stand to gain the most should Russia stop rehearsing attacks on Central and Eastern Europe. ‘Demilitarisation’ would be the ultimate reassurance measure.

Tomas Valasek is Director of foreign policy and defence at the Centre for European Reform.

Comments

Added on 12 Jul 2010 at 08:06 by Rado J

Argument between reassurance and engagement with Russia is almost eternal. Neither can be caried out separately as both sides at NRC table have their doubts about the other. Talking openly about Russian hypothetical membership in NATO at the Lisbon Summit is a little bit far fetched for several Allies. However, strong language about engagement can serve several purposes: first, to show that it is Russia that needs to cross threshold of 21st century political thinking; second, diminish pressure to openly kill Medvedev/Lavrov initiative; third, show that NATO is the place for consultations on euro-atlantic security.

What cuts in US defence budget will mean for the transatlantic alliance

What cuts in US defence budget will mean for the transatlantic alliance

Written by Tomas Valasek, 15 March 2011

by Tomas Valasek

The US defence budget seems set to fall as Washington begins to restore order in its finances. Spending on the military has reached such heights – $700 billion, or 20 per cent of the US federal budget – that it has become too large for deficit-cutters to ignore. Even traditionally pro-defence Republicans now argue that military expenditures need to be reduced along with other government expenses. Europe, too, will feel the pinch: many of the American soldiers currently based on the continent seem certain to go, and some joint weapons programmes will be cancelled. In case of future crises in Europe, NATO’s and the EU’s ability to respond will be tested. The US will expect Europe to lead but European allies themselves have been reducing forces and budgets.

Congress is poised to cut the White House’s request for defence for the fiscal year (FY) 2011 by $15-$20 billion. That might seem low relative to the $700 billion total but of that amount roughly $160 billion is set aside for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will decrease as those conflicts wind down. And much of the remaining money is tied up in non-discretionary spending such as pensions and healthcare for military personnel (the latter alone costs the Pentagon over $50 billion a year). The brunt of the cuts in FY 2011 will therefore fall on the pool of $200-$300 billion that pays for purchases of new equipment, foreign military assistance, overseas bases and non-core military operations. Money spent abroad will be particularly vulnerable to cuts – more and more Americans say that the US government should look after its own rather than, say, wealthy Europeans (all foreign aid is in for big reductions).

The effect of US defence budget cuts on Europe will be five-fold. First, some of the 80,000 US soldiers left in Europe as assurance to NATO allies will most probably leave; Gates said in January 2011 that “it is clear that we have excess force structure in Europe”. The Balts and others in Europe who continue to fear possible trouble with Russia will wonder whether the US has enough forces ready to defend them. But their unease will be tempered by the many military exercises that the US held in the region last year. In 2010, Washington also successfully lobbied the rest of NATO to draft a defence plan for the Baltic. This was done in order to re-affirm US intent to uphold the alliance’s mutual defence pledge, and it seems to have worked: judging by mood at events such as this month’s GLOBSEC conference in Bratislava, the Balts and other Central Europeans are more at ease with Obama. Besides, as Stephen Flanagan of CSIS, a Washington think-tank, points out, “the 50,000 troops that will stay in Europe would be more than double the US ground presence in South Korea, where there is daily risk of imminent war.” Many of the new allies have been busy cutting defence budget themselves: they say that the fiscal crisis leaves them no choice, but the cuts also suggest that they feel little imminent threat from the East. This will make Washington less reticent about withdrawing troops from Europe.

Second, the military assistance that the US provides to help allies to modernise and re-arm will continue to fall. In the past decade, the US generously funded equipment purchases in Europe, with most money going to the new allies. Low-interest US loans allowed Poland to buy F-16 fighter jets, while Romania purchased C-130 cargo planes with US aid. But in recent years, assistance to countries such as Egypt or Pakistan has taken priority – of the $5.4 billion in 'foreign military financing', which the US set aside for 2011, $4.7 billion will go to Middle East and North Africa. The proportion of the aid going to wealthier and less strategic European countries will be slashed further when, as expected, the overall volume of military assistance falls. In the past, US defence companies would have had a decent shot at thwarting cuts in such assistance: they tend to be its main beneficiaries as most of the money ends up with them in the form of procurement orders. But the mood in the US is changing: Republicans in particular argue that the US government should not be in the business of funding new jobs, and that the best job-creation strategy lies in cutting expenses, thus restoring order in the federal budget. Should military assistance to Europe be slashed, as seems likely, programmes such as Romania’s planned purchase of F-16 fighter jets that are financed with US monies would likely be postponed or cancelled. With defence budgets falling in virtually all NATO countries, there is little hope that European allies would pick up the slack.

Third, US personnel on operations in Europe – in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo – will likely be reduced or withdrawn altogether. Because their numbers are low to begin with, the short-term impact will be minimal. Only 20 US soldiers remain in Bosnia in a force that once counted 20,000 American troops. The US has about 800 soldiers left in Kosovo, where the overall NATO force is being reduced from 14,000 to 2,500. Should a new crisis break out in the Balkans, the Pentagon will be able to send more soldiers from bases elsewhere in Europe (primarily Germany). But this reserve force too is being reduced. The downsized Pentagon will be far less willing than in the 1990s to lead military operations in Europe. In the future, Washington will look to its allies to assume main responsibility for dealing with the Balkans and other crises on Europe’s periphery. The defense department’s resistance to a no-fly zone in Libya could be a sign of things to come.

Fourth, those European companies that do business in the US will lose some of their orders – but so will their US competitors. Signs of renewed protectionism have been few so far. While the Pentagon recently chose Boeing over a Franco-German consortium EADS to build a new generation of tanker aircraft, “this is mainly because Boeing’s planes were $2 billion cheaper”, says Andrew Koch, an analyst with Scribe Strategies and Advisors, a Washington consultancy. The European companies have worked hard to erase their US competitors’ advantage: the likes of BAE Systems and EADS pledge to build equipment in the US using American workers, so they are likely to have as many members of Congress on their side as their US counterparts. While competition for US defence contracts will toughen, European companies are not necessarily losing ground to US ones.

Fifth, the future of new weapons funded jointly by the US and its allies is in doubt. Already, the Pentagon has announced that it was pulling out of a US-German-Italian project to build a new generation of medium-range missile defences. This is in large part because the project, MEADS, has suffered technical problems. But the Pentagon, in announcing the decision, also cited financial constraints as a factor. The more the US cuts defence spending, the higher the risk that NATO’s own flagship, continent-wide missile umbrella could be at risk. Announced in November 2010, the system envisions combining future US radars and missiles to be stationed mainly in Central Europe with yet-to-be-developed European sensors and interceptors. But few European governments have come forward pledging money for it. It is not obvious why the US Congress would fund a programme to defend European mainland, which the Europeans themselves are unwilling to support.

Politically, cuts in US defence spending are sure to rankle in Europe. A setback to NATO’s missile defences could be particularly divisive, with new allies lamenting a chance to host US military bases, and with NATO losing one of its key initiatives, which it also has been hoping to use to entice Russia into a closer relationship. The effect of US reductions will be compounded by cuts to military spending in Europe: there is a risk that reductions on one side of the Atlantic will be used to justify corresponding cuts across the sea. NATO remains the most powerful military block in the world but it will lose some of its ability to handle multiple crises simultaneously.

The main challenge for US and European defence communities for the next few years will be to keep NATO’s mutual defence pledge credible: this will require allies to prioritise missions and to hone their ability to diffuse crises before they require deployment of large forces. Even if no such crises occur, the Americans and Europeans will be busy managing the political fallout from cancelled procurement programmes and reduced operations. To minimise damage, the Pentagon should keep allies apprised of its cost-cutting measures. For their part, the Europeans need to co-ordinate better their own reductions in defence budgets, so as to make sure that enough money and resources are left to cover any shortfalls that US cuts will create.

Tomas Valasek is director of foreign policy and defence at the Centre for European Reform.

Comments

Added on 16 Mar 2011 at 04:13 by Sarwar

Isn't it time for the EU to be primarily responsible for Europe's defense? Bridge/Merge CSDP and NATO so that there will be a mechanism for the EU, U.S., and Canada to act together if they wish, otherwise use NATO's assets (SHAPE) for CSDP.

As things now stand NATO chips away at the wider transatlantic relationship. Need to end this obsolete vision of a mighty military alliance.

Sarwar Kashmeri
Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council of the U.S. skashmeri@acus.org
Author of forthcoming: "NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete?" www.2nato2.com

Added on 15 Mar 2011 at 19:14 by Mike Archer

Sir, I read with interest this piece. Your conclusions about prioritising missions and keeping each other informed of savings and cuts are important points.

Perhaps just to play devils advocate, I have the following points to make:

1. Your second point on military assistance is seemingly framed in a context whereby you are envisaging a future conflict with another major power on a traditional basis. Realistically, so what if Romania doesn't take F-16's, who are they going to defend themselves against? It is far more likely to be a war over resources or a cyber war, meaning that money should be spent in these areas and not a modern fighter aircraft designed for sophisticated operational missions.

2. Your third point on operation in Europe. I just don't believe any administration will consider leaving it entirely to European allies to resolve any conflict in Europe or in it's periphery (in which you place Libya, which, although geographically close to the EU, has more strategic importance for the US on the Med). There is no way that another ethnically driven war in Europe would be allowed to go on - the US would surely step in.

3. Final point on future weapons funding. We all know that the missile defence shield is a myth, a pipe dream that will only become reality in decades and after trillion of dollars of investment. Why don't we concentrate on the real needs of future war, like I mentioned before, cyber attack, rapid response to resource scarcity and rogue actor attack with CBRN weapons(whether state sponsored or not)? Surely you agree that, especially given economic climate and current engagements, projects which cost utold amounts with little results are simply detrimental to our present situation.

I look forward to hearing your response.

Is Europe doomed to fail as a power?

Is Europe doomed to fail as a power?

Is Europe doomed to fail as a power?

Written by Charles Grant, 01 July 2009

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Issue 57 - 2008

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Issue 57 December/January, 2008

Europe’s defence and its new security strategy

External author(s): Tomas Valasek

The EU must stand firm on Bosnia

By Charles Grant. External author(s): Tomas Valasek
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Europe’s defence and its new security strategy

Europe’s defence and its new security strategy

External Author(s)
Tomas Valasek

Written by Tomas Valasek, 03 December 2007

The roadmap to better EU-NATO relations

The roadmap to better EU-NATO relations

The roadmap to better EU-NATO relations

External Author(s)
Tomas Valasek

Written by Tomas Valasek, 20 December 2007

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