The implications of military spending cuts for NATO's largest members

The implications of military spending cuts for NATO's largest members

The implications of military spending cuts for NATO's largest members

Edited byClara Marina O'Donnell
External Author(s)
Andrew Dorman, Bastian Giegerich, Camille Grand, Adam Grissom, Christian Mölling

Written by Andrew Dorman, Bastian Giegerich, Camille Grand, Adam Grissom, Christian Mölling, Clara Marina O'Donnell, Brookings, 01 July 2012

Integrating the EU defence market: An easy way to soften the impact of military spending cuts?

Integrating the EU defence market

Integrating the EU defence market: An easy way to soften the impact of military spending cuts?

Written by Clara Marina O'Donnell, 12 July 2012
From Institute for Security Studies

Europe's External Action Service: Ten steps towards a credible EU foreign policy

Europe's External Action Service: Ten steps towards a credible EU foreign policy

Europe's External Action Service: Ten steps towards a credible EU foreign policy

External Author(s)
Edward Burke

Written by Edward Burke, 04 July 2012

NATO ponders austerity and US 'pivot'

NATO ponders austerity and US 'pivot'

NATO ponders austerity and US 'pivot'

Written by Tomas Valasek, 18 May 2012

When NATO heads of state meet in Chicago this Sunday and Monday, two key worries will be on their minds. In a departure from the past six decades, the US has come to style itself as a Pacific, rather than Atlantic, power. And the Europeans are busy plundering their defence budgets in order to cope with the economic crisis. Any one of those two events alone would have a dramatic effect on how the alliance works. Taken together, they risk pushing NATO into irrelevance.

The CER recently explored NATO's future in a new report, 'All alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO'. It concluded that the US 'pivot' away from Europe towards Asia will remain in place irrespective of who wins the presidency in November. Because the US is cutting defence budgets too, the Pentagon will conserve resources. And the United States sees few threats emanating from Europe; it also regards the remaining ones, such as the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet republics, as matters for diplomacy, not arms. NATO has also lost some of its military utility to the US. The Americans have invested far more than the Europeans in their armed forces, and have greatly improved their ability to strike quickly and across long distances. The US military has less need for help from European allies, and finds it increasingly difficult to assign them meaningful roles in joint operations.

In principle, the Europeans ought to be buying new weapons to fill the gap created by the reduced US role in European security.  But the US demand for Europe to do more for its defence has come at the worst possible time: Europe is in the midst of an economic crisis, and the allies, instead of buying more weapons, are busy cutting defence budgets to stave off defaults. The UK will be without aircraft carriers for a decade, Spain seems ready to mothball its only remaining one, while Denmark has abandoned submarines and the Netherlands has ditched its tank forces.

This will have a three-fold impact on NATO. Firstly, the Pentagon is cutting two of its four brigades in Europe. While the US is not reconsidering its obligation to come to its allies' defence, the reduction will extend the timelines on which military enforcements can be rushed there. This will delay the actual moment at which the US comes to the continent's defence, and shifts more of the burden for common defence onto the Europeans.

Secondly, in operations fought not in self-defence but on behalf of causes such as human rights, the US will not necessarily lead. The Libya war established a new operating principle: there, the US handed the command to France and the UK after destroying Gaddafi's air defences. From now on, America will sometimes behave like any other ally, sitting out some of NATOs wars, and doing just enough to help other operations to succeed.

Thirdly, NATO may well fight fewer wars in the future. The Europeans lack some of the hardware such as spying and targeting 'drones' and precision bombs, which are crucial to making wars swift and relatively safe for allies and civilians. If NATO is to fight wars without American help, conflicts will take longer, cause more unintended civilian casualties, and more lives on the NATO side. The European allies, with exceptions such as the UK and France, are already reluctant to fight today's wars. They will grow even more skittish if human and political costs of future conflicts increase. In practice, this means that some future crises similar to those in Kosovo or Bosnia in the 1990s may go unanswered.

Given the confluence of budget cuts and US rebalancing, NATO ought to give serious consideration to reducing its ambitions. Its militaries aspire to be able to fight two major wars and six minor ones simultaneously, which does not seem very credible. To stem further loss of military power, the European allies also need to try much harder to squeeze efficiencies out of collaboration. As a forthcoming CER policy brief notes, governments can buy more power for less money by getting rid of unneeded equipment, merging their defence colleges, sharing training grounds, or buying and maintaining future generations of weapons together ('Smart but too cautious: How NATO can improve its fight against defence austerity', out in May 2012). At Chicago, the alliance will take the first steps by announcing that NATO countries are to jointly finance a new fleet of spying drones. More such projects are needed: the US pivot and European budget cuts have left the alliance undermanned and underpowered, and collaboration is one of the few good solutions the allies have at their disposal.
Tomas Valasek is director of foreign policy and defence at the Centre for European Reform.

Poland's U-turn on European defence: A missed opportunity?

Poland's U-turn on European defence

Poland's U-turn on European defence: A missed opportunity?

Written by Clara Marina O'Donnell, 09 March 2012

France threatens to remove troops in Afghanistan

France threatens to remove troops in Afghanistan

France threatens to remove troops in Afghanistan

Written by , 20 January 2012

Link to press quote:
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/20/145532530/france-threatens-to-remove-troops-in-afghanistan

Breakfast on 'Is collaboration the answer to defence austerity? Perspectives on UK, France, NATO and the EU'

Breakfast on 'Is collaboration the answer to defence austerity?

Breakfast on 'Is collaboration the answer to defence austerity? Perspectives on UK, France, NATO and the EU'

14 March 2012

With Gerald Howarth MP, minister for international security strategy

Location info

London

Event Gallery

EU promotes "pooling and sharing" to cut defence costs

EU promotes "pooling and sharing" to cut defence costs

EU promotes "pooling and sharing" to cut defence costs

30 November 2011

Link to press quote:
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/11/30/uk-eu-defence-idUKTRE7AT0SS20111130

NATO's noble words go for naught

NATO's noble words go for naught

NATO's noble words go for naught

Written by Clara Marina O'Donnell, 07 November 2011

Link to press quote:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/world/europe/08iht-letter08.html

Governments need incentives to pool and share militaries

Defence austerity

Governments need incentives to pool and share militaries

Written by Tomas Valasek, 01 November 2011

by Tomas Valasek

Since the financial crisis began in 2008, EU countries have cut military spending by an amount equivalent to the entire annual defence budget of Germany, Europe's third largest. While the prospects for an economic upturn are dim, the need for credible militaries remains strong – all the more so because the US is signalling that it may not lead future operations in and around Europe. The EU has been urging its member-states to seek defence savings in collaboration. EU officials frequently stress that member-states have no option other than to 'pool and share' their militaries: to make a more common use of training and support facilities, to buy equipment together and to form joint units. Unless such savings measures are taken, the defence cuts will undermine Europe’s ability to respond to future crises on its periphery and beyond.

But what makes obvious sense to experts and officials looks very different to national defence ministers. In most European countries the public care little about defence and will not hold governments responsible for how defence budgets are spent.

From a government point of view, collaboration carries real political costs because opposition politicians and journalists will accuse the ministers of undermining national sovereignty by creating interdependencies with other militaries. Collaboration often takes years to put in place and yields rewards only long after its architects have left office. Initially, it may also cost more than it saves. And defence ministers have little guarantee that any savings which their decisions generate will flow back to the defence budget; often the treasuries take the spoils. So unsurprisingly, many European defence ministers choose the politically safer route of inaction.

The EU is right to want the member-states' militaries to work together. But its approach needs to start with the recognition that defence ministers will need new incentives to do so.

Some help is already on offer. The EU, via its European Defence Agency (EDA), has recently formed a senior expert group, composed of mostly retired high-level officers. They are travelling around Europe sounding out governments on their plans to pool and share and urging them to try harder. The experts should also make it a priority to identify the obstacles to collaboration in each country, and to collect lessons on how countries have been able to overcome national reservations.

The EDA’s planned study on the financial benefits of military collaboration will also be helpful: little hard data exists on potential savings, and a credible risks and benefits analysis would give proponents of pooling and sharing an additional argument against the sceptics. So would another planned EDA study on the depth of past and probable future cuts to European defence budgets. Similar reports, such as the one recently produced by the German Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, make for a sobering read and implicitly help build the case for closer collaboration.

More could be done: the EU institutions could help governments identify strategies that generate maximum savings while entailing minimal losses of national sovereignty. The Netherlands and Belgium point the way: they have completely pooled the maintenance and training of crews for their navies' vessels, but they have kept the actual fleets under separate national ownership. They thus reap the financial benefits of collaboration (because they no longer duplicate schools and repair docks) while preserving the right to deploy the vessels where each government sees fit. The report by EDA's senior experts should highlight such successful collaborative strategies and the EDA should make certain that these are widely distributed. Not all defence ministers will read the experts' conclusions so perhaps follow-up visits by the experts - this time to spread lessons learned on pooling and sharing -- may be in order. And because ministers come and go, the EDA should also make sure its experts speak to the armaments and defence policy directors.

As its next step, the EDA should help defence ministers obtain assurances that savings generated through collaboration will be reinvested in defence. While each EU country has a somewhat different way to fund defence, some ideas might find universal application. For example, the French pay for defence through a five-year, legally binding budget allocation. This could be tweaked to allow the defence ministries to keep any savings generated during the life of the budget framework. In Slovakia, the government has pledged to take past reforms into account when cutting the budgets of line ministries in the future. Departments that found savings will have their budgets cut less dramatically than those that have not reformed. Other governments will want to pursue other solutions - the key point here is that defence ministers must feel that they will be able to reap the benefits of pooling and sharing; that they will see a reward for taking political risks.

Lastly, the EDA should explore whether governments can be offered direct financial incentives to pool and share. NATO has long recognised that if its member-states are to connect their militaries, they need help covering the costs directly related to building the physical links. So the alliance created a centralised pool of money, into which all allies pay and which reimburses governments for 'networking' costs, such as the upgrades that were needed at Central European airfields and ports so that they could fuel and communicate with West European aircraft and ships.

Pooling and sharing also essentially requires states to build a network, which entails initial outlays even though it saves money later on. For example, if two countries merge their military colleges, they will need to shut down some facilities and pay some of the personnel a severance fee. The prospect of such initial outlays may well discourage co-operation. So the EDA should sound out its members about the possibility of creating a 'pooling and sharing fund' to reimburse the costs that result when governments choose to enter into military collaboration. Alternatively, because most EU countries are also members of NATO, they could agree to use NATO's fund to encourage pooling and sharing. However, the fund would first have to be expanded (in recent years it has run low on money) and its mandate broadened from funding infrastructure upgrades to include other costs such as severance payments or clean-up of disused military facilities.

There may well be additional ways to entice the governments to pool and share. The EU institutions should make it their priority to identify such incentives and apply them as much as possible. Pooling and sharing may make eminent economic and military sense, but they are fraught with sensitivities and political dangers. The national governments will need all the help and encouragement they can get.

Tomas Valasek is director of foreign policy and defence

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