Issue 49 - 2006

Bulletin 49

Issue 49 August/September, 2006

Britain and France must pool parts of their defence

External author(s): Edgar Buckley

Serbia’s choice

External author(s): Angela Heath
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Edgar Buckley, Angela Heath

Serbia’s choice

Serbia’s choice

Serbia’s choice

External Author(s)
Angela Heath

Written by Angela Heath , 01 August 2006

Turkey, Russia and modern nationalism

Turkey, Russia and modern nationalism

Turkey, Russia and modern nationalism

Written by Charles Grant, 01 August 2006

CER/RUSI Roundtable on 'Turkey and European energy security'

CER/RUSI Roundtable on 'Turkey and European energy security'

CER/RUSI Roundtable on 'Turkey and European energy security'

17 March 2008

Speakers included: Mehmet Ogutcu, BG Energy Holdings, John Roberts, Platts & Gottfried Steiner, OMV.

Location info

London

Is Turkey Iran's friend?

Is Turkey Iran's friend?

Is Turkey Iran's friend?

Written by Katinka Barysch, 04 November 2009

by Katinka Barysch

Is Turkey really Iran’s “friend”, as Recep Tayyip Erdogan claimed in a recent interview with the Guardian newspaper? Erdogan’s visit last week to Tehran suggests so. He met not only President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but also Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a rare honour. He announced plans for energy and commercial co-operation with Iran and defended the country’s right to civilian nuclear power, calling its energy programme “peaceful” and “humanitarian”. Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, thanked Erdogan for his critical stance on Israel.

Policymakers in the West are getting worried that Turkey’s growing ties with Iran – by lessening that country’s sense of isolation – may frustrate diplomatic efforts to prevent Tehran from building a nuclear bomb.

Turkey’s official line is that it fully supports international efforts to persuade Iran to stop its enrichment programme, backed by the threat of tougher sanctions. The Turkish government claims that it is using closer ties with Iran to pass on tough messages to the leadership there. However, Turkish political leaders and high officials have been very cautious in their public pronouncements about Iran. “Iran does not accept it is building a weapon”, Erdogan is quoted as saying by the Guardian. “They are working on nuclear power for the purposes of energy only."

Erdogan has often mentioned Iran in the same sentence as Israel, perhaps implying that if one country in the Middle East has nuclear weapons it might be unfair to prevent other ones from building them too. Following his Tehran trip, he referred to western pressure on Iran as ‘arrogant’ because it came from countries that themselves had nuclear weapons. It would be preferable, he said, to have a nuclear-free Middle East and a nuclear-free world.

Turkey’s rather friendly stance on Iran may be understandable and acceptable at a time when the West’s diplomatic efforts are making at least some progress. But what if current negotiations fail? Would Turkey support the tougher sanctions that the US and most EU countries are threatening?

When asked this question, a top Turkish diplomat (at a recent EDAM roundtable in Bodrum) was evasive: “We would have to first see the content of the resolution. And we would have to make sure that we bring Russia and China on board.” This answer implies that Turkey may support sanctions in the (unlikely) event that they are backed by the United Nations Security Council but not if they are unilaterally imposed by the Americans and the Europeans. Another Turkish diplomat (at the ‘Istanbul Forum’, a big conference focusing on Turkey and the Middle East in October) summed up Turkey’s stance on Iran’s nuclear programme as “diplomacy, more diplomacy and even more diplomacy”.

Many Turks fear the impact of tougher on their own economy. Turks say that the 1999 sanctions against Iraq resulted in the loss of what had then been their second most important trading relationship, and that European sanctions on Serbia in the 1990s cut off one of Turkey’s most important transport artery to the EU.

Trade between Turkey and Iran has been growing fast in recent years, to reach an estimated $ 6 billion in 2008. Politicians from both sides say they want to see that figure double or even triple over the next 5-10 years. Iran is also Turkey’s second biggest gas supplier after Russia. Many Turks think that Iranian gas will be essential if Turkey is to fulfil its ambition of becoming a regional energy hub. Further sanctions would therefore harm Turkey’s economic interests. Already, US pressure forced Turkey to put on ice a $3.5 billion investment deal in the Iranian gas sector signed in 2007 – although Erdogan confirmed that Turkey still wanted to go ahead with such energy deals during his recent Tehran visit.

More importantly, perhaps, Turkish support for tougher sanctions would end the recent rapprochement between Tehran and Ankara and could even lead to retaliation. “We have no choice but to have good relations with our big neighbours”, explained one Turkish parliamentarian at the Istanbul Forum. “This conviction stood behind our decision in 2003 not to allow the Americans to march into Iraq from our territory. We knew we would have to live with Iraq afterwards, no matter what the outcome of the war.”

The Erdogan government values its relationship with Iran as part of its ‘zero problem’ neighbourhood policy. Having been more or less isolated in the region only 20 years ago, Turkey now has flourishing political and trade links with most of its immediate neighbours, as well as many countries of the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. There are even plans to open the border to Armenia, closed since 1993. Ankara is proud that it is one of the few countries that ‘talks to everyone’. This strategy has entailed links with Hamas and, more recently, visa-free travel and trade liberalisation with Syria.

Iran is one of Turkey’s most important neighbours and therefore crucial for the perceived success of the ‘zero problem’ strategy. Turkish politicians like to point out that the current Turkish-Iranian border dates back to 1639 and that the two countries have not been at war since. Since the implosion of Iraq, the two countries have worked together more closely on security issues, in particular to prevent Kurdish separatism and terrorism, which threatens both countries.

As ties with Iran thicken, Turks see the country’s nuclear programme as less of a threat. A third of Turks now think that a nuclear armed Iran would be acceptable, according to the latest Transatlantic Trends survey from the German Marshall Fund. Two years ago, the share was half that, at 17 per cent. In the US, only 5 per cent say they could live with a nuclear armed Iran. Turkish leaders hardly ever say explicitly whether they consider a possible Iranian bomb as a threat. When asked whether he was worried about such a prospect, one official at the EDAM roundtable responded: “We are under Nato’s nuclear umbrella.”

This apparent confidence, however, hides some deep-seated anxiety and mistrust. Turkey and Iran may not have been to war with each other for centuries, but they are natural rivals in a volatile region. Arguably, much of Turkey’s recent regional diplomacy has been designed to contain Iran’s growing influence, from Turkish efforts to help stabilise Iraq to building closer links with Syria. Neither the Americans nor the Iranians took up Ankara’s offer to mediate between the two, preferring to deal with each other directly. At the Istanbul Forum – which devoted a lot of time to discussing Iran – not a single Iranian official showed up.

Many Turks fear that a nuclear armed Iran would change the regional balance of power and trigger an arms race in this unstable part of the world. One Turkish politician, when asked what Turkey would do if efforts to stop the Iranian weapons programme failed, said: “We will have to build our own bomb.” It is statements like this that make some people suspect that the reason why Turkey is now starting its own nuclear programme is not only to improve energy security but also to be prepared in case of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

Turkish officials deny this categorically. They insist that their country needs nuclear power to satisfy fast-growing energy demand, reduce reliance on imported gas and cut CO2 emissions. Moreover, it could take Turkey a decade to build up a nuclear capacity. Already, the first tender to build a nuclear plant is being reviewed after only one company (from Russia) submitted a bid.

Meanwhile, Turkey is in talks with Washington about buying a missile defence system against short and medium-range missiles. The claim of Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, that this system would have “nothing to do with Iran or any other country” just begs the question.

Turkey’s ambiguous stance towards Iran is symptomatic of the difficulties that Turkey faces in trying to combine its growing regional ties with its traditional orientation towards the West. As a long-standing NATO member and a country negotiating for EU membership, Turkey is expected to align itself with the US and Europe – or at least not do anything that undermines the West’s political objectives in the Middle East. As a regional power, Turkey will want to act independently and avoid antagonising its neighbours. It is not clear how long Ankara will be able to avoid tough choices.

Katinka Barysch is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform.

Comments

Added on 05 Nov 2009 at 19:27 by Yeappppp

I think countries can not be friend . Countries act accordingly their benefits . Thats why Turkiye co-operate with Iran .

Added on 05 Nov 2009 at 09:07 by seyed javad miri

Greetings
I enjoyed the piece as it addressed political realities in a redressed fashion. However it seems the author failed to see the deep cultural interdependence which exists between two countries. More than 60 percent of Iranians are Turks and more than 40 percent of Turkish nationals are Iranians (i.e. by being Kurds) and 15% of Iranians are ethnic Kurds. Besides, 25% of Turkish nationals are Alevites and Shias while 35% of Iranians are Sunnis ... . In other words, there are great many historical and cultural issues which make these two seemingly divided nations into one people provided the politics of nationality is deconstructed along more realistic lines and this may-be what current politicians are attempting to envision.
best wishes
Dr. Seyed Javad Miri
Visiting Professor of Sociology
Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies
Tehran
Iran

Added on 04 Nov 2009 at 21:45 by AYDIN SEZER

The answer is absolutely NO.

Pipeline politics: Why Nabucco is stuck

Pipeline politics: Why Nabucco is stuck

Pipeline politics: Why Nabucco is stuck

Written by Katinka Barysch, 29 January 2010

by Katinka Barysch

Last year, plans for the Nabucco pipeline – almost a decade in the making – appeared finally to make some headway. In March, the EU earmarked €200 million for preparatory work. The European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development promised to help with financing the €10 billion cost. In July, the countries through which the 3,000 km pipeline will run (Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey) signed a long-awaited ‘intergovernmental agreement’ on transit rules. Ratification of the IGA has been plodding along. Meanwhile, the six energy companies (from the transit states and Germany) that form the Nabucco consortium continued to look for gas to fill the pipeline. Two of them are trying to get involved in a big gas project in northern Iraq and another one in Turkmenistan. The EU started looking at the idea of aggregating European gas contracts through a ‘Caspian development corporation’ to get the likes of Turkmenistan interested in selling large volumes of gas westwards.

Now, however, Nabucco is stuck again. The reason is a dispute between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The 8 billion cubic metres of gas for the first phase of Nabucco was always expected to come from Azerbaijan’s new Shah Deniz II gas development. But Baku and Ankara cannot agree on how much Azerbaijani gas should go to Turkey, at what price and under what conditions. While the dispute continues, the companies involved in Shah Deniz II have stopped drilling.

Turkey already buys around 6 bcm of gas from the Shah Deniz I field, for a very good price. It sells half of that gas on to Greece at a much higher price. Baku insists that the old pricing formula needs to be revised. Turkey disagrees. As long as this issue is not resolved, an agreement on the Shah Deniz II gas looks unlikely. Without that gas, it is hard to see how Nabucco could get under way. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has started shipping gas to Russia instead and promised to sell some to Iran and even China.

Although both Turkey and Azerbaijan insist that they really quarrel about energy, the fact that the two countries get on badly these days does not help. Azerbaijan became less forthcoming in the negotiations after Turkey announced a courageous plan to normalise its relationship with Armenia last year. Azerbaijan is furious about the idea that Turkey could open its border with Armenia before a solution has been found for the ‘frozen’ conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, an area that has been occupied by Armenian troops since the early 1990s. Turkish leaders are in fact ambiguous about that, with Prime Minister Erdogan saying that the two issues are linked somehow. The Turkish parliament has not yet ratified the documents needed for the normalisation of relations with Armenia. Some now say it never will.

Although the prospects for a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement are not great, it is likely that Turkey and Azerbaijan will eventually reach a deal on energy that could restore momentum to Nabucco. Baku has a strategic interest in getting access to the European gas market. Turkey’s interest in becoming a European energy hub is just as strong. Both countries know that once gas starts flowing through Nabucco (or another pipeline that connects the EU market directly with the huge gas reserves of the Caspian), oil majors will be much more willing to explore other projects in the region.

The EU should stand ready to give Nabucco a bit of a political push once the Turkey-Azerbaijan dispute is resolved. Europeans have been too ready to dismiss Nabucco as a ‘pipe dream’. Russia, on the other hand, is taking it extremely seriously. Moscow fears that Nabucco will further erode its lucrative and politically expedient gas transport monopoly on the Eurasian landmass. It is pushing the rival South Stream pipeline and has signed agreements with a number of potential transit countries, including Turkey. It is also trying to buy up gas that could potentially feed Nabucco in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. A lot of that is posturing: “Any energy company that wants something from Russia at the moment has to sign up to South Stream,” says one gas expert. The memoranda of understanding on South Stream are vague and do not involve any financial obligations. But they could be just enough to put off potential financiers for Nabucco and sap what little political momentum there still is behind the project.

South Stream looks expensive, technologically complicated and unnecessary. Nabucco appears relatively realistic and it is further advanced in the planning process. The EU should call the Russians’ bluff by asking Gazprom to use Nabucco to ship gas into South and Central Europe.

The EU also needs to work harder to create more coherence between its energy policy and the political relationships it is building with potential supplier countries. In the past, the energy and foreign relations departments of the Commission, the European Council's high representative and the member-states have not always acted in unison.

The Lisbon treaty (which streamlines the EU’s foreign policy machinery) should help. But the EU’s nascent energy diplomacy can only make progress if the EU governments allow this to happen. Many European leaders and officials (in particular in Germany) remain convinced that the task of securing oil and gas supplies must be left to private companies and that the EU has no role to play in talking to energy producing countries about gas contracts and pipelines. The current highly politicised dispute over Nabucco should help to convince them of the contrary.

Katinka Barysch is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform.

Comments

Added on 12 Feb 2010 at 13:57 by Anonymous

There is a lot more influencing this:
Past Neocon meddling (December 2008 Condoleeza Rice signing a protocol with the Ukraine including assistance in the overhaul of the gas transit system. Yes, right before the latest problems. You can still find this protocol on Google cached pages) in the region has been reduced. Through hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling domestic natural gas production in the US has roughly doubled already thus greatly reducing any potential dependence on LNG from Gazprom. So the US interest in preventing Gazprom's monopoly has been greatly reduced. By the way Gazprom even during the cold war has been a pretty reliable partner. The Neocon stupidity has only succeeded in reinforcing the Russia-China ties. Looks that the current US administration has recognized this at least to some level. By the way Gazprom seems already to have looked in an alternate approach to Nabucco (if you cannot beat them, join them or even better buy yourself in).

Added on 31 Jan 2010 at 12:23 by Gokhanym

Unfortunately this Article is unfair and consist of false claims. Turkey is not a country to stuck Nabucco. European Countries are stuck Nabucco. Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria are the Countries signed South Stream Project with Russian Federation. Austria are trying to become main hub for Russian gas. Azerbaijan can not find a PARTY to sign and buy its gas. Who will be the BUYER is still unknown in Nabucco. Turkey and Azerbaijan are contuniung their negotiations and Turkey accepted to increase Azery Gas Price and New Price will be retroactive from 15 April 2008. Solving the European gas availability is firstly EU Member Countries Problem. Because they are getting EU funds not TURKEY. So responsibility is firstly Austria, Germany, Hungary
Romania and Bulgaria then you can ask Turkey that is still waiting for Openning of negotiations of Energy Chapter in EU membership negotiations.

Added on 29 Jan 2010 at 16:23 by Aydin SEzer

Turkish goverment is now playing crucial role in Nabucco Project. The AKP goverment is trying convince Russia to realize Samsun- Ceyhan oil pipe line project for Turkish CALIK group, a pro government company, and also nucleer power plant for another Turkish company namely CINER GROUP. So, the turkish government signed Nabuucco agreement for the purpose of to use it againts Russia, not to finalize it.

CER/SWP/Brookings Daimler forum on 'World order and global issues'

CER/SWP/Brookings Daimler forum

CER/SWP/Brookings Daimler forum on 'World order and global issues'

19 November 2009

Speakers included: Carl Bildt, Ivo Daalder, Christoph Heusgen.

Location info

Stockholm

CER/ECFR conference on 'Achieving energy security in Europe'

CER/ECFR conference on 'Achieving energy security in Europe'

CER/ECFR conference on 'Achieving energy security in Europe'

17 November 2009

Speakers included: Carl Bildt, Andris Piebalgs, Maciej Wozniak, Pierre Noel, Richard Morningstar, Hryhoriy Nemyria. With the support of the Swedish Presidency of the EU.

Location info

Brussels

Turkish business and EU accession

Turkish business and EU accession

Turkish business and EU accession

External Author(s)
Sinan Ülgen

Written by Sinan Ülgen, 01 December 2006

EU business and Turkish accession

EU business and Turkish accession

EU business and Turkish accession

External Author(s)
Katinka Barysch, Dr Rainer Hermann

Written by Katinka Barysch, Dr Rainer Hermann, 22 June 2007

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