Dansk EU-rabat kan koste dyrt

Dansk EU-rabat kan koste dyrt spotlight image

Dansk EU-rabat kan koste dyrt

Written by John Springford, 06 February 2013

Link to press quote:
http://www.information.dk/450269

Sound public finances require more than low budget deficits

Sound public finances require more than low budget deficits

Sound public finances require more than low budget deficits

Written by Simon Tilford, 04 January 2013

The European Commission and the European Central Bank like to compare the eurozone's budget deficit and overall level of public indebtedness favourably with the US and the UK. Senior policy-makers from both institutions cite the allegedly superior fiscal performance of the eurozone to justify their outspoken support for austerity. They claim that the eurozone has acted more decisively to put its public finances on a sustainable footing and will reap a growth dividend for this, as confidence returns more quickly to the eurozone than to the US or UK. Is the Commission’s confidence justified? Or is it guilty of using data selectively to justify policies that are not working?

The eurozone as a whole has certainly run smaller budget deficits than the US or the UK over the last five years. Whereas the eurozone deficit averaged 4.4 per cent of GDP per year in 2008-12, the UK's was 8.4 per cent and that of the US almost 10 per cent. However, an economy’s budget deficit only says so much about its debt dynamics. The sustainability of a country's fiscal position is less about the size of its budget deficit at a particular point in the economic cycle, and much more about the size of its debt stock, the cost of borrowing and the trend in nominal GDP (that is, economic growth plus inflation). And here the picture becomes less clear.

The eurozone budget deficit may have averaged less than half the US's over the last five years, but the eurozone’s ratio of public debt to GDP has grown only slightly less rapidly than the US's. The eurozone's debt stock has increased from 70 per cent of GDP in 2008 to an estimated 94 per cent in 2012. Over the same period, the comparable US ratio rose from 76 per cent to 107 per cent, and that of the UK from 52 per cent to 89 per cent.

Moreover, around five percentage points of the rise in the US debt stock reflects the cost of recapitalising the country’s banks (the comparable figure for the UK is around 8 per cent of GDP). It is hard to put a figure on the cost to the tax-payer (so far) of bank recapitalisations in the eurozone, but it is certainly less than 2 per cent of GDP. It is legitimate to include the costs of bank recapitalisation in the three economies' debt stocks: eurozone governments (individually or collectively) will eventually have to pump large amounts of public money into their banks, pushing up the level of public debt across the currency union. 

If the cost of bank recapitalisation is excluded, public indebtedness has only risen slightly more quickly in the US than in the eurozone. The UK's debt ratio has increased significantly faster than the eurozone, even after taking into account the expense of recapitalising banks. However, the rise in the UK's debt stock has outpaced that of the eurozone's by less than suggested by the UK's much bigger budget deficit.

Why has the ratio of eurozone debt to GDP risen almost as much as in the US, despite the US running a budget deficit of twice the size of the eurozone over this period? One factor is nominal GDP or the 'denominator', which has grown more quickly in the US than in the eurozone, reflecting a much stronger economic recovery. This has contained the expansion of debt to GDP in the US relative to the eurozone, where the expansion of nominal GDP has been much weaker. Nominal GDP in the UK has also risen more rapidly than in the eurozone, although this reflects higher inflation rather than a superior growth performance. Inflation is no panacea, of course. Eventually investors will demand a higher premium to compensate for it. But they are only likely to do so once economic recovery is underway (and other assets become more attractive than government bonds). At that point fiscal deficits should fall rapidly in any case, as tax revenues rise and social transfers fall.
 
The crucial importance of nominal GDP to a country’s debt dynamics is illustrated by Italy. Despite managing to run a small deficit, Italy has experienced a very large rise in the ratio of debt to GDP over the last five years. One reason is that Italian nominal GDP actually fell slightly between 2008 and 2012. Greece, Ireland and Portugal, together with Spain, have all run much larger deficits than Italy, though only in the case of Ireland has the deficit been significantly bigger than in the US (reflecting the scale of Ireland’s bank recapitalisation programme). But Greece and Ireland have experienced huge falls in nominal GDP (14 per cent in both cases), whereas Spain and Portugal have posted declines of around 3 per cent. Falling nominal GDP is a major reason why they have all experienced dramatic increases in their debt ratios, far in excess of the US or the UK.

Another factor explaining why the eurozone's debt stock has risen so quickly despite a relatively small deficit is higher real borrowing costs. Quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, combined with concerns over weak economic prospects (which undermines the attractiveness of other assets), have pushed down government borrowing costs. Both the US and UK have been able to borrow (and refinance debt) very cheaply. Crucially, borrowing costs have been below the rate of inflation in both countries, which slows the accumulation of debt relative to GDP.

By contrast, average borrowing costs across the eurozone have been considerably higher. While Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Austria have been able to borrow as cheaply as the US, and France has only had to pay a bit more, struggling eurozone economies such as Italy and Spain and, of course, the three small peripheral economies, have had to pay far more to borrow funds. Investors have questioned whether their membership of the currency union is sustainable and have demanded a premium to offset the convertibility risk. Since the ECB indicated in mid-2012 a readiness to purchase potentially unlimited quantities of struggling eurozone countries’ debt, borrowing costs have fallen. However, they still remain well above the rate of inflation.

A combination of stagnant or declining nominal GDP and borrowing costs in excess of inflation is poisonous for many eurozone countries' debt dynamics. It is all but impossible to prevent a rapid accumulation of debt to GDP when the nominal GDP is not growing, irrespective of how much fiscal virtue a country demonstrates. Indeed, from the perspective of debt dynamics, fiscal austerity can be counterproductive. As Italy demonstrates, running a primary budget surplus (the budget balance before the payment of interest) is no guarantee of fiscal sustainability if interest rates are high and nominal GDP stagnant or falling.

What about the future? The European Commission forecasts that eurozone public debt will barely rise as a proportion of GDP in 2013 and actually start falling in 2014. Economic forecasting is necessarily imprecise, but the Commission’s strain credibility. Every six months it has to revise down its growth forecasts and revise up its forecasts for debt. The coming year’s revisions look set to be even bigger than those we have seen over the last few years.

Even assuming the ECB continues to hold down borrowing costs, there is little indication that they will be below the rate of inflation in the struggling eurozone countries. And the outlook for economic growth is extremely poor. Assuming that austerity in the current economic climate is as bad for growth as the Commission and the IMF now acknowledge (but do not incorporate into their forecasts), real GDP will fall steeply in 2013 across much of the eurozone, pushing down inflation with it. Nominal GDP will do little more than stagnate (falling steeply in the south, stagnating in France and the Netherlands and rising somewhat in Germany). Assuming further austerity (on top of that already announced) is avoided, the eurozone could eke out a bit of nominal GDP growth in 2014. The risk, however, is that the deepening of the slump brought on by austerity will weaken public finances further and be used to justify more austerity. This, in turn, would weaken nominal GDP further.

There may be a miracle, but in all likelihood the eurozone is going to combine the worst of both worlds: stagnant or falling GDP and rapidly rising debt. The prolonged slump threatens to further weaken the eurozone's banks, increasing the amount of money that eurozone governments will eventually have to borrow in order to recapitalise them. It is impossible to say whether by 2017 (ten years after the start of the crisis) the eurozone or the US will have experienced the bigger build-up of debt relative to GDP. However, what can be said with a high degree of certainty is that the US economy will be substantially larger in 2017 than it was in 2007.

Not only is the eurozone likely to experience a lost decade, but the growth potential of its economy will almost certainly have eroded further as mass unemployment and weak business investment damages the supply side. The UK’s experience is likely to be much closer to the eurozone's than the US's. Notwithstanding its euroscepticism, the strategy of the British government has more in common with the rest of Europe than it does with the US. It is stepping up the pace of fiscal austerity in the face of extremely weak consumption and business investment and a worsening outlook for exports.

 Simon Tilford is chief economist at the Centre for European Reform.

EU leaders vow to boost Europe's defence capabilities

EU defence

EU leaders vow to boost Europe's defence capabilities

Written by Hugo Brady, 14 December 2012

Link to press quote:
http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/eu-leaders-vow-to-boost-europes-defence-capabilities

Brytyjski ekspert: Cameron w sprawie budżetu Unii postawi na swoim

EU budget

Brytyjski ekspert: Cameron w sprawie budżetu Unii postawi na swoim

Written by John Springford, 23 November 2012
From Gazeta Wyborcza

Britain and the EU budget

EU budget

Britain and the EU budgetvideo icon

BBC News
Written by Charles Grant, 21 November 2012

Link to video:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b01nyhc9/BBC_News_at_Ten_21_11_2012/

Angela Merkel warns UK will struggle alone if it turns against EU

Angela Merkel warns UK will struggle alone if it turns against EU spotlight image

Angela Merkel warns UK will struggle alone if it turns against EU

Written by John Springford, 07 November 2012

Link to press quote:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/07/angela-merkel-warns-uk-eu-budget

Can Angela Merkel talk Cameron into being a more flexible ally?

Can Angela Merkel talk Cameron into being a more flexible ally? spotlight image

Can Angela Merkel talk Cameron into being a more flexible ally?

Written by Katinka Barysch, 07 November 2012
From The Guardian

Much ado about little: Britain and the EU budget

Much ado about little: Britain and the EU budget

Much ado about little: Britain and the EU budget

Written by John Springford, 07 November 2012

As almost all European governments are cutting spending, it is hardly a surprise that the EU’s budget is under fire. The European Commission has rather optimistically proposed a real terms increase of five per cent in total spending over the next budget period, which runs from 2014 to 2020. This amounts to 1.05 per cent of projected EU GDP over that period. Most of the countries that pay more into the budget than they get back reject this proposal. Germany and Ireland want the budget limited to one per cent of EU GDP (which means that as Europe’s economies grow, the budget can grow too, but at a slower rate than the Commission wants). However, British Prime Minister David Cameron wants to go further: he has promised to veto anything but a freeze in real terms. It may be difficult to back down from this position in budget negotiations: the opposition Labour party combined with backbench Conservative rebels to win a parliamentary vote last week that called for a cut to the budget, defeating the government. Cameron would be unlikely to get a larger EU budget through the UK’s parliament if he compromises at the summit, on November 22nd.

Britain is not the only budget hawk: Sweden and the Netherlands have also demanded big cuts to the Commission’s proposal. But neither has demanded a freeze. The UK is likely to be further isolated in Europe, after its veto of the fiscal compact in December last year, if Cameron refuses to compromise. Amid the politicking over the size of the total budget, Westminster has paid little attention to the potential costs to the Exchequer of the proposals on the negotiating table, and how much extra the UK could pay. This note offers some answers, and in doing so allows us to judge whether UK obduracy is likely to achieve very much.

How much does the UK currently pay, and how much does it receive?
As a comparatively rich country with a small agricultural sector, the UK has in recent years been a net contributor to the EU budget. The UK passes tax revenue to Brussels, and receives less expenditure in the form of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments, regional development funds, and other transfers in return. But it has a rebate from Brussels – a reduction in its contributions negotiated by Margaret Thatcher in 1984, which many other EU countries consider to be unfair now that Britain is one of the richer members of the club.

Britain’s net contribution is how much it pays in, less how much it receives back, in EU spending and the rebate. In most budget negotiations, British governments try to reduce wasteful and iniquitous farm spending and the size of the budget, and protect the rebate. Tony Blair’s 2005 agreement to cut the rebate to help pay for the costs of EU enlargement is the exception that proves the rule: even Blair, a pro-European prime minister at the height of his power, did so reluctantly, and fought hard for CAP reform.

Given that any country can veto the EU budget, member-states must build alliances to succeed. The UK is isolated after its veto of the fiscal treaty, and so would do well to be cautious if it wants to reduce spending. Britain wants the budget frozen at its 2011 level. But if the talks collapse, which is a distinct possibility, the 2013 budget will simply be rolled over to 2014, but with inflation added. The budget would end up far larger than 2011.

If the UK really wanted to cut wasteful spending and promote growth, it could accept the German proposal for a budget capped at one per cent of EU GDP, in exchange for cuts to the CAP and a transfer of that money into infrastructure and regional development spending. France has threatened to veto any budget that does so, but they could be isolated if Britain were prepared to make concessions, which President Hollande may wish to avoid, given the difficult negotiations over the euro.

But such a deal may be difficult for Cameron, who has chosen to make budget cuts his priority. The UK’s net contribution grew by three-quarters between 2006 and 2012, from £3.9 billion to £7.4 billion (€4.8 to €9.2 billion). The UK’s transfers to Brussels were low in 2008 and 2009 because it suffered a larger recession than other member-states, and in 2010 and 2011 payments were larger because its economy made a (small) recovery. On the expenditure side of the ledger, European Social Fund and Regional Development Fund spending in the UK is falling over time. These funds provide support for struggling regions with an income less than three-quarters of the EU average. Over the course of the last budget, Brussels has phased in the poorer newer members in Central and Eastern Europe, so that a greater proportion of structural funds go to these countries. These two factors explain most of the rise in the UK’s net contribution.

As regional funding has declined, agricultural payments have become the large majority of EU spending in Britain. This change in the composition of spending explains why Cameron is in a difficult negotiating position. Switching money from the CAP to regional spending would mean that the UK’s net contribution would rise, as fewer regional funds are disbursed in Britain, thanks to enlargement. If Cameron were to try to offer up more of the rebate to convince France to reform the CAP, the UK’s net contribution would rise even further. Thus, Cameron can either try to limit the UK’s contribution to the EU or try to improve what it is spent on. The best policy would be the latter, but the best politics – at least in domestic terms – is the former.

How much could the UK contribute to the next budget?
Britain’s net contribution to the next budget will not be decided before the negotiations at the summit in late November – and quite possibly not even then. But we can make some assumptions about how much more the British taxpayer might end up paying. The UK’s fiscal watchdog, the Office of Budget Responsibility, assumes that the UK net contribution is going to stay at around the 2012 level as a percentage of the total EU budget – five per cent. This seems right, for the following reasons. The UK is unlikely to give up or reduce its rebate. British economic growth is projected to be around the EU average: if it grew faster than other countries, the budget arithmetic would mean it would become a bigger net contributor. Finally, regional development funding is not coming back to the UK: Central and Eastern Europe will remain poorer than Western Europe between now and 2020. Given that the UK contribution should stay at around the same level, as a proportion of the total budget, we can then project forward how much it is likely to contribute, given the three main proposals on the table.

* A budget freeze (UK proposal: the British Parliament’s vote for a cut is only advisory, and this remains the UK government’s position)
* A budget capped at one per cent of EU GDP (the German position)
* A five per cent increase in the budget, as a proportion of EU GDP, to 1.05 per cent (the Commission proposal)

The UK government’s position implies a continued UK net contribution of around £7.4 billion (€9.2 billion). The German government’s proposal would mean the UK paying slightly more – an average of £400 million (€499 million) a year over the budget period. The Commission’s proposal would see the UK contribution grow, in tandem with Europe’s economic growth. So, under the Commission’s proposal, the UK’s net contribution would grow from £7.4 to £8.2 billion (€9.1 to €10.2 billion), an average of £550 million per year (€690 million) higher than under the UK proposal. This would mean a total increase, above the UK’s proposal, of £3.9 billion (€4.8 billion) over the seven years. (See chart).
 
 

Source: author’s calculations, based upon the GDP and budget projections in European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020’, (2011) p. 20.

These numbers are difficult to appraise without context. Under either Germany’s proposal, or the Commission’s, the UK could end up paying around £400 and £550 million per year more, at most. This is around 0.03 per cent of GDP. It is the same amount that England and Wales spend each year on flood and coastal defences, or the same size as Oxfordshire County Council’s budget.

Furthermore, Britain’s hand is weakened, because of the rebate. It is difficult for Cameron to build consensus for either an overall freeze to the budget, or a cut to the CAP, because of it. Britain's net contribution is smaller than other big EU countries. Germany is the largest net contributor, followed by France and then Italy. The UK is the fourth largest, despite being both richer and larger than Italy. If Cameron brought down the negotiations over such a small sum, the UK would find itself pressed further into the margins of Europe. It would do better to compromise on the overall size of the budget, and negotiate for it to be spent more wisely.

John Springford is a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.

Comments

Added on 08 Nov 2012 at 16:00 by anonymous

Can't remember where I saw it, but isn't part of the problem with lower regional policy spending in the UK that the UK government is cutting its own contributions to projects where half of the funding comes from the EU budget?

With no UK funding the EU funding can't be used and projects have to close even though the money was already committed?

The Commission should stand firm on Iceland's accession negotiations

Iceland & the EU

The Commission should stand firm on Iceland's accession negotiations

Written by Stephen Tindale, 08 August 2012

Iceland is the world’s longest running democracy. At a time when some member-states are struggling with democracy in the face of economic crisis, and the European institutions are still being criticised for a democratic deficit, Iceland would therefore be a valuable and welcome member of the club. Iceland also has much to teach the EU about energy policy: it generates three quarters of its electricity from hydroelectricity, and the rest from geothermal plants. All of its heat comes from geothermal.  However, the European Commission should remain firm on its negotiating demands on fishing and whaling.


Iceland applied to join the EU in 2009, in the aftermath of its banking crisis. The island saw EU membership as a source of stability and economic recovery. Out of the 35 negotiating chapters, 18 have been opened. Ten of these have been provisionally completed. Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle hopes that accession negotiations will be completed in 2013 – though the most difficult chapters, on agriculture, environment and fisheries, have not been negotiated yet.  As a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) and Schengen, Iceland has already adopted two-thirds of the acquis.

Iceland’s accession bid has quite broad support among member-states. The main obstacle to its accession is that Icelanders themselves are likely to reject it. Once negotiations are completed, Icelanders will vote in a referendum on whether or not to join the EU. Polls suggest that only around a quarter support EU membership, with over half against and around a fifth undecided. The level of support for membership has fallen since negotiations began in 2009. This is in part because Iceland’s economy has recovered from the serious 2008 banking and debt crises, and is now growing at over four per cent per year. And EU membership is no longer seen as a source of stability.  But support for membership has also fallen because of the European Commission’s perceived (by Icelanders) unfairness towards Iceland over the Icesave  settlement and the current “mackerel war”. And the totemic issue of whaling remains to be confronted.

Icesave was an online facility run by the Icelandic bank Landsbanki between 2006 and 2008. It gained over 300,000 customers in the UK, and over 125,000 in the Netherlands. But in 2008 Landsbanki was placed into receivership. The British and Dutch governments argue that the Icelandic government is obliged to pay at least €20,000 to each depositor, and that Icelandic and foreign depositors must be treated in the same way. Reykjavik disagrees. It argues that, had the restructured bank been obliged to bear the full cost of the debt, it would have had a negative equity of €2.6 billion, which would have had to be paid by Icelandic taxpayers.

Half the Icesave debt to depositors has now been repaid. The EFTA Court will hear legal argument about the remainder on September 18th.  The time for negotiation over Icesave has passed, since the matter is now before a court. So the key negotiating issues are fishing and whaling. The European Commission should remain firm on these issues. It would be counter-productive to lower existing EU standards to attract a new member. If this firmness leads to Iceland voting no in a referendum, so be it.

Fishing has always been a bone of contention between Iceland and other European countries. The Common Fisheries Policy is not included in the EEA, so Iceland can set its own policy. The fishing industry provides 40 per cent of Iceland’s export earnings, and eight per cent of employment on the island.  The current dispute focuses on mackerel. Iceland has increased its annual quota for mackerel catch enormously – from 2,000 tonnes to 146,000 tonnes. Reykjavik argues that this is sustainable because climate change is resulting in more mackerel in its waters. The Commission disagrees, and argues that Iceland’s quota is 36 per cent higher than it should be to be sustainable. Ireland, France, Portugal and Spain are demanding sanctions. The Commission has threatened to block Icelandic ships from unloading mackerel at EU ports.

The EU and Ice­land (plus the Far­oe Islands and Nor­way) will meet in Lon­don in Sep­tem­ber to try to reach agreement.  Some movement by the Commission, to defuse the argument and avoid conflict, would be understandable. But the Commission should not move much. It should continue to base its position on its scientific estimate of a sustainable catch.

On whaling, the Commission should not move at all. In 2006 Iceland resumed commercial whaling of fin whales and minke whales. Thus it joined Norway in defying the international moratorium on commercial whaling.  Iceland has always caught some minke whales for “scientific research”.  So the 2006 decision made little practical difference on minke – it simply represented Iceland becoming more open about its reasons for whaling. But it did represent a restart of fin whale hunting. Fin whales are an endangered species. Iceland maintains that there are enough fin whales in Icelandic waters for a small catch to be sustainable. This may or may not be correct, but is anyway not relevant to EU negotiations. EU law prevents the killing of any whales, even those which (like minke) are relatively numerous.  EU law is based partly on the need to protect biological diversity, but partly also on the need to prevent animal suffering.  Being killed by harpoons is a particularly painful, and often slow, way for an animal to die.

By no means all Icelanders favour whaling. Whale watching is an important part of their tourism industry – and increased tourism is one of the drivers of economic recovery. Yet some Icelanders argue that whaling is an important part of their culture and tradition. Culture is important, and European integration must respect most cultural traditions. But not all, and not those which involve cruelty. Iceland has an impressive culture –and has produced some of the world’s greatest literature. So it ought to be possible, in the twenty-first century, for Icelanders to separate their cultural heritage from whaling. If this is not possible, EU membership should also not be possible.

In any case, the ongoing dispute about Icesave and the Icelandic economic recovery may well result in Iceland voting no to EU membership, whatever concessions the Commission has offered on fish and whales. The EU should not lower its standards whatever the rewards. To lower them and get no reward would be particularly unwise.
Stephen Tindale is an associate fellow at the Centre for European Reform 

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