Stifling progress in Russia and China

Stifling progress in Russia and China spotlight image

Stifling progress in Russia and China

Written by Charles Grant, 24 December 2012
From The New York Times

Obama and the Russians: Moving on to the 'post-reset'

Obama and the Russians: Moving on to the 'post-reset'  spotlight image

Obama and the Russians: Moving on to the 'post-reset'

Written by Charles Grant, 07 November 2012

Link to press quote:
http://www.rferl.org/content/obama-russia-moving-on-post-reset-relations/24763754.html

Russia needs a plan for modernising its economy

Russia's economy

Russia needs a plan for modernising its economy

Written by Charles Grant, 06 November 2012


Russia’s economy is not performing badly. Thanks to the high oil price, economic growth is likely to stay at 4 per cent or a little less for the next few years – respectable by West European standards. The problem is that Russia’s rulers do not appear to have a plan for modernising the economy, which is alarmingly unbalanced. Oil and gas provide half the government’s revenue and almost 70 per cent of export earnings. Output of oil and gas is flat and few new fields are coming on stream. Even if the oil price stays high, Russia is heading for current account and budget deficits in the years ahead.

But Vladimir Putin, now in his third term as president, seems unconcerned. I recently attended the Valdai Club, a group of Russian and foreign think-tankers, academics and journalists that meets Putin and other Russian leaders once a year. Compared with six or seven years ago, when I first attended these meetings, Putin’s attitude has evolved. He has become increasingly relaxed, to the point of complacency. He displays little sense of urgency about tackling the challenges facing Russia.

One participant, former German defence minister Volker Rühe, asked Putin an easy question: “Historians will say that in your first two terms as president, you brought stability to Russia. What would you like them to say about your third term?” Putin answered that he did not care what historians said, and that he was a pragmatist. He was happy that personal incomes had doubled during his time in charge, that Russia had $500 billion of foreign currency reserves and that the demographic decline had been arrested. He had nothing to say about his vision for Russia’s future or his own role in shaping it.

Asked whether it was important for Russia to reform its institutions, Putin merely talked about some legal reforms that were underway, adding that the central bank was an efficient body and that the tax administration had improved. Probed on the brain drain from Russia, he was insouciant: he said it was normal for people with skills to move from one country to another, in the way that many Britons went to the US. He told us that Russia was enticing lots of foreign academics to spend periods at its universities by offering them scholarships.

Putin was particularly upbeat about economic co-operation with China. It is now Russia’s biggest trading partner, with $83.5 billion of trade a year, compared with Germany at $70 billion, according to Putin. He said that both sides wanted trade to reach $100 billion a year. “This will happen as we are happy to buy more Chinese goods and they will buy more oil – and in the future, gas.” That last point is debatable: the Chinese seem unwilling to pay the price for gas that Russia is demanding. Putin added that there would be more co-operation on nuclear power – the first plant built by Russia in China was running and there would be more to come – as well as aviation and space technology. Other Russian leaders told us that growing economic ties to China – plus co-operation over Syria at the United Nations – would not extend to security (in Beijing there are reports that Russia proposed closer military relations earlier in the year, but had been rebuffed by Chinese leaders).

“We don’t need to go east or west, we are in a good place in the centre of Eurasia,” asserted a senior parliamentarian. Russian leaders are proud of the initial success of the Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which has boosted trade (by 40 per cent, according to the parliamentarian). Russian economists say the Customs Union has led to regulatory competition between Russia and Kazakhstan, as they seek to attract investment. This competition may have helped them move a little way up the World Bank’s ease of doing business index – Kazakhstan has climbed to 47th place, and Russia to 120th.

The Russian economy can certainly benefit from more trade within the Customs Union and with China. But neither will bring about the structural changes that it needs. Russia’s liberals are in a gloomy state. On my previous visit to Moscow, last March, some of them – both within the government and outside it – were optimistic about the prospects of change. Following the winter demonstrations, Putin seemed to have understood that Russia needed political reform. He had announced that regional governors would be elected and that it would be easier to register political parties. But now the state is clamping down on opposition leaders. While the Valdai Club met, Leonid Razvozzhayev, a leftist opposition politician, was kidnapped in Kiev, taken back to Moscow and charged with various crimes.

There are still plenty of economic liberals in positions of power, either as ministers or advisers inside the government, or think-tankers on the outside who provide reports for ministers. But they see that Putin is leaning in an authoritarian, statist direction and that improving the rule of law is not his priority. They know that so long as the judiciary remains subject to pressure from the state or special interests, foreigners will think twice before investing in sectors other than oil and gas.

One senior figure in the Russian system summed up the liberals’ despair: "Russia needs a new model of economic growth, and a new system of governance – the current one is not suited to meet new challenges. Putin has been an outstanding leader. But the destiny of Russia depends on the mind of a single person and his ability to change the paradigm of how he sees things."

The ‘tandem’ system of government – when Prime Minister Putin shared power with President Dmitri Medvedev – has been replaced by what the Russians call an extreme vertikal of power. Although the presidential elections were not conducted fairly, Putin’s victory reflected the popular will and has enhanced his legitimacy. This has facilitated the concentration of power in one person’s hands to a greater degree than ever happened in the Soviet system, post-Stalin. President Putin alone decides foreign policy. On economic policy, according to some observers, Medvedev, now prime minister, still has a little influence.

Everyone in government pays lip service to the idea that the economy should rebalance, so that manufacturing and services play a greater role. But nobody seems to have a convincing plan for achieving that objective. One minister admitted: “We don’t understand how to break the dependency on oil and gas, since different players have different interests.” In fact, the hard-liners in the security establishment and some of the clans around Putin probably do not want rebalancing: it would curb the rent they extract from the natural resource industries and would have to be accompanied by a strengthening of the rule of law, which would constrain their freedom of action.

The Valdai Club heard two views on how the economy could rebalance: top down and bottom up. Some senior figures said simply that the state needed to invest more in high-tech industries like space-science, biometrics, pharmaceuticals, nano-technology and nuclear energy. Putin said the government had found an extra $60 billion for a special fund that would invest in hi-tech industries.

The bottom-up view, which is much more plausible, was well expressed by one of Putin’s advisers: "The only way to rebalance the economy is to improve the investment climate, so that we get more foreign investment into non-oil and gas sectors. That means tackling corruption." 

One leading banker was extremely critical of the government: "Russia is a big exporter of oil and gas, entrepreneurial talent and capital." He described the customs administration as "totally corrupt". He complained bitterly about Putin’s election promises to raise the salaries of public sector workers, which had led to knock-on wage inflation throughout the economy. Several ministers expressed worries about the economy’s declining competitiveness – one of them reporting that Russian wages were now 2.5 times comparable ones in Ukraine.

Another senior banker said the government did not have a mechanism for implementing decisions except by shouting at people. Since German Gref had departed as economy minister in 2007, he said, the government had had no comprehensive vision; now each ministry did its own thing.

A year ago Alexei Kudrin, an economic liberal, resigned as finance minister, partly because he disliked plans for a massive boost in defence spending. Many Russian economists agree with Kudrin that the boost will harm the economy. In the ten years to 2020 the defence budget is due to grow by 23 trillion roubles (more than $700 billion) – at the cost of spending on infrastructure, health, education and R&D. The share of government spending taken up by the defence, interior and emergency ministries is due to stay in the range of 18-20 per cent from 2011 to 2015. But the proportion spent on education, science, healthcare, justice and culture is due to fall from 8.3 per cent to 5.8 per cent. 

Putin, predictably, defended the military build-up. “We see the growing application of force in the international arena, and this is revitalising international relations, so we are strengthening our defence and military capabilities.” Also, he pointed out, a lot of Russia’s defence systems were old and needed replacing.
 

Amidst all the gloom over the Russian economy, some of the more liberal ministers took a brighter view. They talked of the seven-year plan for selling off stakes in state companies that would run to 2019. Its purpose, they said, was not only to make companies more competitive but also to raise money for the budget.

These liberals also pointed to the benefits of membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which would subject Russian industries to increased competition – though more from China than from the West. The WTO will force Russia to lower its average tariffs from 9.5 per cent to 6 per cent by 2015. WTO membership will also make the government curb subsidies to some industries and to farming. “We will have to learn how to apply government support in ways that don’t break the rules,” said one senior minister, who predicted disputes over cars and agriculture.

But the liberal ministers know that Russia cannot properly modernise its economy without progress on the rule of law and democratisation. "We have a working judicial system and democratic rules, though they’re not ideal," said one. “Many people are unhappy about that, but the majority don’t care – they are focused on their wages, children and housing, rather than the political system. That is an argument for more democracy.” He is almost certainly right that less than half the population cares about political freedom. This is the root of Putin’s power and bodes ill for the economy.

Charles Grant is director of the Centre for European Reform


US foreign policy after the presidential election: What should Europeans expect?

US foreign policy after the presidential election

US foreign policy after the presidential election: What should Europeans expect?

Written by Clara Marina O'Donnell, 25 October 2012

Issue 86 - 2012

Issue 86 - 2012 spotlight image

Issue 86 October/November, 2012

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What Romney would mean for Europe

What Romney would mean for Europe

What Romney would mean for Europe

Written by Clara Marina O'Donnell, 26 September 2012

In launching cases, Commission shows it plays by rules

In launching cases, Commission shows it plays by rules

In launching cases, Commission shows it plays by rules

Written by Charles Grant, 06 September 2012

Link to press quote:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444273704577635520979357382.html

Burma: An EU foreign policy success

Burma: An EU foreign policy success

Burma: An EU foreign policy success

Written by Charles Grant, 23 August 2012

Disunity is bad but pluralism is good. The story of EU policy on Burma illustrates this point. Disunity is normal: sovereign states with varied histories and traditions might be expected to disagree. The remarkable thing is that in the end, on Burma as on much else, the EU manages to achieve a common policy. The policy may even be better for being the product of disagreement and debate. Unfortunately the EU tends to do its disagreeing in public but when it reaches a sensible consensus often conceals the fact.

On Burma the disagreements start with the name. EU documents refer to Burma/Myanmar. Can one really have a policy on a country when one cannot agree on the name?

This disagreement is in fact not so unreasonable. On one side is the argument that if the UN, its neighbours and some people in the country call it Myanmar, the EU should follow suit.  But the argument on the other side is also strong: an early act of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), one of the nastier manifestations of the military in its 50-year term of office, was to change the official name in English to Myanmar. The SLORC claimed that this name had the advantage of including minorities not from the predominant Bamar (or Burman) ethnic group. But this argument is largely false since ‘Burma’ is in fact a colloquial form of ‘Myanmar’ and the one the British rulers opted for. Furthermore, Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters gave the name political significance by refusing to follow the SLORC’s decree. The lady now uses Myanmar when speaking the Burmese (or Myanmar) language, thereby offending some of her supporters, but insists on using Burma in English, thereby offending some generals. Too much energy has been wasted on this rather unimportant issue.

On the more critical issue of sanctions there are respectable cases to be made both for and against. Let us leave aside the EU’s visa bans and asset freezes on members of the regime, which have certainly discomforted those targeted. The arguments against broad sanctions are that they corrupt and distort an economy; they impoverish people; they often create illegal trade from which the primary beneficiaries are those in power; and they provide a convenient alibi for the government’s own economic mismanagement. If sanctions bite, the intention is that they will hurt people and thus encourage them to overthrow the government through elections or revolution.  That makes them particularly ineffective when dealing with military regimes. Besides, it is contact, not isolation that brings about change. Trade leads to more extensive relations with other countries; it opens countries up, eventually creating the middle class that is essential for democracy.

But there are also valid arguments on the other side. The damage done to the Burmese economy by EU sanctions has always been small compared with the damage inflicted by the military government. Spending on health and education has been minimal, while the defence budget as a proportion of GDP – officially 4.9 per cent, though the true figure is certainly much higher – surpasses that of any other country in the Association of South-East Asia Nations (Indonesia and the Philippines both spend 1 per cent, Malaysia and Thailand 1.5 per cent, Vietnam 2.5 per cent and Singapore 3.6 per cent, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies). 

The sanctions did have one powerful effect, namely, to signal to European companies that the Burmese regime was unacceptable, and that they should stay away. Almost universally, they took this advice. The sanctions also gave moral support to the opposition, thousands of whose members have been beaten and locked up.
The arguments of those who opposed sanctions nevertheless had an impact on what the EU did. Its sanctions were designed to limit direct damage to the livelihoods of ordinary Burmese. They were selective and targeted on the extractive industries – mainly timber and gem stones – where the military and their cronies are dominant (though the sanctions’ effectiveness was impaired by some of these goods being rebadged and exported via Thailand).
The EU matched sanctions with a commitment to provide humanitarian support, not just at the time of cyclone Nargis in 2008, but on a continuing basis, with an emphasis on health and rural poverty. The US chose a very different path, applying an enormous and complex web of sanctions to Burma, similar to those in force against Iran. The US blocked World Bank lending and cut off Burmese banks from the international financial system. Congressional restrictions obliged the Global Fund (which ran programmes to fight malaria, tuberculosis and AIDS) to pull out of Burma in 2005. The EU led a consortium to replace the work of the Global Fund. In sympathy with those who argued against having anything to do with the Burmese regime, the EU ran all its programmes through NGOs.
Western sanctions were probably not the main cause of the thaw in Burma. When authoritarian regimes decide upon profound reform, foreign pressure may be a factor but is often less important than the ambitions of key leaders. Mikhail Gorbachev pursued glasnost and perestroika because he was a communist patriot.  In South Africa, F W de Klerk saw that his country had no future with apartheid. U Thein Sein, who became Burma’s president in March 2011, appears to be a man who wants the best for his country, and who knows that he cannot tackle poverty and under-development without first engaging in political reform and reconnecting Burma to the world.

Perhaps change would have happened without sanctions. But if so it would have happened differently. It is hard to imagine that representatives of the National League for Democracy (the NLD, the party led by Aung San Suu Kyi) would have spent hours in the Ministry of the Interior going through lists of political prisoners if their release had not been one of the conditions for suspending sanctions. And would the NLD have even been there at all? It was always an EU demand that all political forces should participate in the political process. That was code for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, as well as Burma’s too-often forgotten ethnic minorities.

Then there is the China factor. Burma’s leaders were becoming worried about not only their economic dependency on China – a major trading partner and source of investment – but also their reliance on its diplomatic protection in international organisations. They wanted to balance the ties to Beijing with closer ties to the West, and that required reforms that would persuade the EU and the US to remove sanctions.

As it turns out, Western sanctions provided not only the opposition with a card it could play, but also reformists within the government. A government trying to reform cannot easily show benefits to sceptical conservatives, at least in the early stages. But greater respect from foreign powers – Hillary Clinton, David Cameron and Catherine Ashton have been among the recent visitors – and the removal of sanctions are visible rewards that a government can point to when it is fighting difficult internal battles.

In the case of Burma the opposition has been a cause worth supporting. Not only Aung San Suu Kyi herself, but also her supporters are fully committed to democracy and the rule of law. She has shown that she is ready to compromise – contrary to the propaganda persistently put about by the regime. Her approach to the government, the constitution and the parliament has involved many compromises. And on the question of sanctions, she and her party have, understandably, been somewhat ambiguous. She believes that Burma has a long way to go before it is free and democratic, and she has not called for the US to end all sanctions. But she has gone along with the EU’s suspension of sanctions and favours responsible foreign investment to create jobs.

On certain points, such as corruption and the fair conduct of elections, Aung San Suu Kyi remains immovable. This should be welcome; too many countries in Asia have become accustomed to a kind of semi-democracy, in which elections are held but are not particularly fair, in which the rule of law functions but not in quite the same way if you have friends in high places, and in which corruption is a part of the system. It is good that for once that a senior political figure in Asia is supporting high standards. If the Burmese are lucky, eventually she will prevail – and hopefully set an example to other Asian countries.

The Burmese government’s announcement this month that it is scrapping press censorship suggests that it is still bent on reform. But in June, violence between the Muslim Rohingya minority and Buddhists in the western province of Rakhine left dozens dead and nearly a hundred thousand homeless. Burma’s leadership continues to ignore the basic rights of Rohingyas. The opposition says too little about their plight – and some of its leaders have even questioned whether the Rohingyas belong in Burma. Several other ethnic conflicts continue to fester in various corners of the country. Further EU development aid should be conditional not only on continuing progress on human rights, but also on the regime seeking to achieve reconciliation with the ethnic groups.

The EU can offer its own expertise – from countries such as Spain – in building political structures that accommodate minorities. The EU should also encourage the army to retreat from political life, while recognising that this process will inevitably be slow. In Turkey the army has spent more than 50 years – with many ups and downs – gradually relaxing its grip on the political system. One suspects that Egypt’s generals will continue to control large swathes of that country’s economy for several years to come.

This year the EU has, to its credit, stepped up aid and opened an office in Rangoon. Its policy on Burma has looked a bit messy: in the past, pursuing sanctions but not across the board, and giving aid but not working with the government; and now, suspending rather than lifting sanctions while not insisting that every single political prisoner should first be released – while continuing to press the case of those who remain. Messy is what you expect when 27 countries debate and compromise. But the common line forged by the EU has helped to change Burma for the better.


Charles Grant is director of the Centre for European Reform.

A compact between China and the European Union

A compact between China and the European Union

A compact between China and the European Union

External Author(s)
Chen Shuxun, Cui Zhiyuan, Feng Zhongping, Gao Shixian, Gu Zhenqiang, Pan Jiahua, Xing Hua, Zhou Hong, François Godement, Mark Leonard, Eberhard Sandschneider, Andrew Small

Written by Chen Shuxun, Cui Zhiyuan, Feng Zhongping, Gao Shixian, Gu Zhenqiang, Pan Jiahua, Xing Hua, Zhou Hong, François Godement, Mark Leonard, Eberhard Sandschneider, Andrew Small, Charles Grant, CER - FPC - DGAP - Chinese Academy of Social Sciences - Asia Centre, 05 September 2006

Choices for Europe

Choices for Europe

Choices for Europe

External Author(s)
Nathaniel Copsey, Carolyn Moore

Written by Nathaniel Copsey, Carolyn Moore, Clara Marina O'Donnell, CER - University of Birmingham, 01 May 2009

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