Stalled rally puts pressure on Spain

Stalled rally puts pressure on Spain

Stalled rally puts pressure on Spain

Written by Simon Tilford, 18 September 2012

Link to press quote:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443995604578004472432263946.html

Germany's savers feel resentment and guilt over pressure to end euro crisis

Germany's savers feel resentment and guilt over pressure to end euro crisis

Germany's savers feel resentment and guilt over pressure to end euro crisis

Written by Katinka Barysch, 16 September 2012

Link to press quote:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/16/germany-resentment-guilt-savers-euro-crisis?newsfeed=true

Weidemann resignation report turns up heat on ECB's Draghi

Bundesbank & ECB

Weidemann resignation report turns up heat on ECB's Draghi

Written by Simon Tilford, 31 August 2012

Link to press quote:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/feedarticle/10416772

Will a new German constitution save the euro?

Will a new German constitution save the euro?

Will a new German constitution save the euro?

Written by Katinka Barysch, 29 August 2012

If the Social Democrats win next year’s general election in Germany, they will ask voters to adopt a new constitution in a referendum. The new document, so they plan, would remove the legal fetters that currently prevent Chancellor Angela Merkel agreeing to eurobonds or joint deposit guarantees. Not only the Social Democratic Party (SPD), also politicians from Merkel’s ruling coalition are now speaking out in favour of a referendum. Some analysts are rejoicing that Berlin is finally preparing the ground for the fiscal union that will save the euro. But this is Germany, where policymaking is complex and slow. The debate about a new constitution might sap political energies without contributing much to the stability of the single currency.

German politicians mean different things when they talk about a euro-related referendum. Sigmar Gabriel and his fellow leaders of the SPD say they want voters’ consent to a eurozone fiscal union that involves not only debt mutualisation but also joint budget-planning, harmonised tax rates and tough financial regulation. Some pro-European MPs in Merkel’s own Christian Democratic Union (CDU) agree on the need for a new constitution. But many others insist that the current document leaves enough leeway for euro rescue measures. Some CDU politicians use talk about a referendum mainly as a warning shot to the constitutional court: if you judges continue constraining Merkel’s euro policies, a new constitution will restore power to elected politicians. Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble predicts that a constitutional referendum will happen “quicker than I would have expected a couple of months ago”. But he does not say what it would entail.

Horst Seehofer, leader of the traditionally euro-wary Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU’s smaller Bavarian sister party, wants a referendum each time the EU assumes new powers, bails out a struggling member or admits new countries. And he probably hopes voters will say no to these. Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle from the Free Democratic Party (FDP, another coalition member), contemplates not a German but a Europe-wide referendum on euro rescue measures. All parties are spooked by the recent successes of the Pirate party which campaigns for more country-wide referendums.

Even if Germany’s politicians could agree on a referendum strategy, this would not be a quick fix to save the euro.

Germans are having this debate right now because the constitutional court has indicated that EU integration could not go much further on the basis of the current constitution. Stricter budgetary oversight from Brussels, as envisaged by the fiscal compact, could be problematic. Eurobonds or any other kind of unlimited liability involved in a fiscal or banking union would be incompatible with the constitution. These would undermine Germany’s statehood and democracy by constraining parliament. If politicians cannot promise different fiscal policies, voters are deprived of a real choice and democracy suffers.

These constraints cannot be removed easily because the German constitution contains an ‘eternity clause’ (Article 79) that sets in stone certain principles, notably democracy, federalism and the market economy. No parliamentary majority and no referendum can alter these principles. Hence, the only way for Germany to accede to a fiscal union is to convene a constitutional assembly, work out a new constitution and put it to a referendum.

Some lawyers say this could be done quickly: only the eternity clause and the one detailing how Germany transfers powers to international organisations (Article 23) need to be tweaked. But more likely the constitutional assembly would be inundated with calls for more extensive social rights, a reform of federalism and a new voting system, to name but a few. “This would be an extremely long process”, predicts a constitutional expert.

Nor is it assured that Germans would vote yes in the ensuing referendum. Eurosceptics will argue that the new constitution will lead Germany into the dreaded transfer union, characterised by permanent money flows from Germany to the eurozone’s South. And even if a new constitution was adopted, who says there would be a political majority for eurobonds? Most Germans are against debt mutualisation even if it comes with tough budgetary oversight, according to a recent Emnid poll. Even among SPD voters, less than 40 per cent are in favour. “It’s not that if we had a new constitutional clause we would just wave through debt mutualisation”, says one CDU advisor.

And there is a last hurdle: Germany might adopt a plan for fiscal union only to be blocked by Austria, Finland or the Netherlands. After all, this is not really a debate about the German constitution but the future shape of Europe.

Nevertheless, the constitutional debate will continue because it suits both the opposition and the government. The SPD seeks to sharpen its political profile ahead of the 2013 election. It has so far loyally supported Merkel’s euro policies in parliament. Now many voters complain that they no longer know what the SDP stands for. The SDP is trying to change that, not by blocking Merkel’s policies but by going beyond them.

The CDU also gains from the constitutional debate. The opposition accuses Merkel of lacking a blueprint for the euro, of reacting to market panics, and of recklessly putting taxpayers’ money at risk without delivering more European integration. By talking about a new pro-European constitution, the government looks like it has a plan while it can put off hard decisions until after the 2013 election.

Now all eyes are on the constitutional court again. On September 12th the judges will issue a preliminary verdict on the European Stability Mechanism and the fiscal compact. They are unlikely to strike them down. But they will define conditions for making the ESM and the compact compatible with the constitution.

Some constitutional experts expect that the court will use the occasion to pronounce on what a process of constitutional renewal might look like. Others think that the court will shy away from encouraging such a process and instead widen the government’s room for manoeuvre within the current basic law.

Whatever the court does, the debate about a new, pro-European constitution will hot up this autumn. But do not be fooled: Germany is still a very long way from agreeing to eurobonds.

 Katinka Barysch is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform.

The CER guide to the French presidency

The CER guide to the French presidency

The CER guide to the French presidency

External Author(s)
Tomas Valasek

Written by Tomas Valasek, Charles Grant, Clara Marina O'Donnell, Hugo Brady, Katinka Barysch, Philip Whyte, Simon Tilford, 04 July 2008

The view from 2027

The view from 2027

The view from 2027

Written by Charles Grant, 22 March 2007

A primer on the German presidency

A primer on the German presidency

A primer on the German presidency

Written by Katinka Barysch, 21 December 2006

Can 'good Italy' triumph over 'bad Italy'?

Can 'good Italy' triumph over 'bad Italy'?

Can 'good Italy' triumph over 'bad Italy'?

Written by Charles Grant, 01 August 2012

The key battles for the survival of the euro will be fought in Italy more than anywhere else. Mario Monti’s technocratic government is struggling to push through sufficient reforms to convince financial markets that economic growth will return and thus erode the country’s mountain of public debt. Unless EU institutions intervene in government bond markets to lower the country’s cost of borrowing, Italy may soon be frozen out of those markets. The EU’s bail-out funds may just have enough money to provide Spain’s financing needs for the next few years, but they would then have no spare capacity to save the larger Italian economy. So Italy’s inability to borrow could lead to the euro unravelling – unless the Germans suddenly agree to bigger bail-out funds or the mutualisation of eurozone debt.
When the euro was conceived, more than 20 years ago, many economists thought the Italian economy ill-suited to take part. Then Italy’s reformist governments in the 1990s did just enough to convince the EU’s leading member-states that it should be allowed into the single currency. But after the launch of the euro in 1999, with Silvio Berlusconi prime minister for much of the time, reform more or less stopped.
Bill Emmott’s new book, ‘Good Italy, Bad Italy: why Italy must conquer its demons to face the future’ (Yale University Press), provides an excellent account of what is rotten in the state of Italy. When editor of The Economist, in 2001, Emmott started to run a series of investigative stories that exposed Berlusconi’s questionable financial dealings. One cover proclaimed: “Why Silvio Berlusconi is unfit to lead Italy”. The Italian prime minister, unamused, complained of an “E-Communist plot” against himself, pointed out that Emmott looked like Lenin and launched two libel actions that The Economist fought and won (though one of these is still subject to appeal).
Emmott’s book is particularly good on the sorry story of the Italian economy. Only Haiti and Zimbabwe grew more slowly in the period 2000-10. He describes how archaic labour market rules that prevent employers of more than 15 people from firing workers have kept companies small and thus damaged productivity. The lack of competition in the economy is a major cause of Italy’s service firms being inefficient. As a result, businesses pay more than they should for logistics, information and communications technology, marketing, transport and legal advice. There are 290 lawyers for every 100,000 Italian citizens, compared with just 22 in Britain. Emmott explains how an ageing population, unmeritocratic universities, low levels of foreign direct investment and the high level of public debt (over 120 per cent of GDP) depress the economy. Meanwhile a black economy amounting to 20-25 per cent of GDP weakens the state.
Emmott defines ‘Bad Italy’ as “the urge to seek power in order to use it for self-interested purposes, to amass power to reward friends, family, bag-carriers and sexual partners regardless of merit or ability, and by doing so to build clans and other networks that are beholden to you, and that live by enriching themselves at the expense of others, by closing doors rather than opening them, by excluding rather than including…This sort of selfishness involves a special and even wilfully destructive disregard for a wider community or, especially, national interests, institutions, laws and values.”
The roots of Bad Italy are embedded in the political system and the nature of Italian society. Emmott’s descriptions of these are not as profound as his economic analysis. He does not say a great deal about the centre-left, which held power from 1995-2001 and again from 2006-08 but reformed very little (though its record is somewhat better than that of the centre-right). He might have examined why the Italian centre-left is so weak and fragmented, compared with that in Britain, France or Germany. However, Emmott is good on the nefarious influence of the Catholic Church on politics: for many years it supported Berlusconi because of his stance on gay marriage and in vitro fertilisation – and because he exempted Church property from taxation.
Emmott could have focused more on the many vested interests that profit from the current system and have been so successful in blocking reform. But he implies that they can be overcome because half the book is about ‘Good Italy’, the Italy that draws its strength from civil society, promotes vigorous entrepreneurialism and thinks globally. One of the book’s merits is to point out that Bad Italy is not synonymous with the south of the country, nor Good Italy with the north. Emmott takes the reader on a tour of success stories, to ‘Addiopizzo’, an anti-mafia NGO in Sicily; the Tecnam sports aircraft manufacturer near Naples; the Brunello Cucinelli cashmere clothing company near Perugia; Rainbow, a world-beating maker of animated children’s cartoons near Ancona; the Slow Food movement in Turin; and well-known firms such as Luxottica (sunglasses) in Milan and Ferrero (chocolates) in the Langhe region of Piedmont.
Emmott shows that energetic companies, usually led by brilliant individuals, can beat the system and succeed. He sets out a list of reforms that Mario Monti – or the next prime minister – should seek to achieve, to tilt the system in favour of Good Italy. But he does not attempt to say how a reformist government should seek to overcome the vested interests of Bad Italy, or why Good Italy will ultimately triumph.
Mario Monti, a brilliant economist and the incarnation of the hopes of Good Italy, would surely agree with Emmott’s analysis. But his government is embattled. Within Italy, trade unions, professional associations and other conservative lobbies have diluted many of Monti’s reforms. In democratic countries, the most able governments find it hard to introduce structural economic reforms, even when economies are growing; the losers feel the pain immediately while the benefits take years to emerge. When an economy is shrinking – as is the case in Italy, partly because of excessively tight fiscal policies across the EU – it is almost impossible to implement structural reforms.
Monti’s noble efforts to reform Italy may have come too late. Bad Italy is extraordinarily resilient. Even if Monti’s government survives until the elections that are due in spring 2013, the entrenched power of Bad Italy may yet force Italy out of the euro. And if Italy and the other southerners quit, the EU’s leaders may find it hard to convince financial markets that France – which though a much stronger economy than Italy, suffers from some of the same ailments – can stay in the euro.
Charles Grant is director of the Centre for European Reform.
A similar article appears in the August 2012 edition of the Literary Review.









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