CER quick reaction: The Czech elections

What happened?
Czechia held parliamentary elections over the weekend. As expected, former prime minister Andrej Babiš’s populist ANO party finished first, overperforming pre-election polling and receiving 35 per cent of the vote. The governing Spolu, an alliance of moderate right-wing parties, gained 23 per cent, while its partner, STAN, a regionalist party, received 11 per cent and the Pirates, a progressive green party that left the coalition in 2024, finished on 9 per cent. The eurosceptic far-right SPD significantly underperformed, finishing at 8 per cent – partly because the Motorists, the more moderate of the two far-right parties, cleared the parliamentary threshold and increased their vote share to 7 per cent.

ANO now faces a difficult period attempting to form a government as all mainstream parties have ruled out working with it. Babiš announced a minority single-party government after the results came out, with support from the two far-right parties, the SPD and the Motorists.

Babiš was already in power between 2017 and 2021 and unsuccessfully ran for the presidency in 2023. His time in government was marred by a large-scale corruption scandal and allegations of political interference in the judiciary. His company, Agrofert, was charged with defrauding the EU of €2 million, a case that is still ongoing in the Czech legal system.

Given the fraud investigation and ANO’s lack of a majority, Babiš’s path to the premiership may still be blocked. President Petr Pavel earlier raised the possibility of vetoing Babiš’s participation in government because of the Agrofert case and his earlier questioning of NATO commitments (Babiš during the 2023 presidential debate said he would not send troops to Poland and the Baltics if attacked – a stance he later walked back on). Pavel blocking the nomination is an unlikely outcome, and in any case, Babiš could nominate an ally instead of himself to lead the government. But difficult coalition talks could still lead to uncertainty about the new government in the next few months.

What does this mean for Czechia?
Czechia has taken a decidedly populist turn (back). Besides ANO’s victory, the unexpectedly strong showing of the Motorists shows dissatisfaction with the status quo. At the same time, the SPD’s poor performance and the far-left pro-Russian Stačilo’s inability to clear the threshold demonstrate some immunity to extremism. Babiš, similar to his first time in government, has vowed to “put Czechs first”, echoing US President Donald Trump. This contrasted with the outgoing government’s emphasis on supporting Ukraine to remain on the “right side of history” and budget discipline.

One of the main reasons behind ANO’s victory is Czechia’s flagging economy. Babiš has promised handouts to pensioners and young people among others, lower energy prices, and tax cuts to businesses. His economic promises are not dissimilar to those of Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice in Poland, both of which claim to represent the interests of those ‘left behind’.

On foreign policy, Babiš has promised to end unconditional support to Ukraine and has opposed increasing Czechia’s defence spending. At the same time, Czech arms producers benefit significantly from arms deliveries to Ukraine, making some kind of continuation a possibility – as in Slovakia, which has halted military aid but allowed commercial exports to boom.

Looking back at Babiš’s previous tenure in government, there was a lot of noise but the former businessman remained pragmatic on key issues. Therefore, while Czechia’s vocal support for Ukraine would certainly come to an end, an ANO government is unlikely to result in a full U-turn on foreign policy. Not least because Czech society is more resilient to propaganda compared with Hungary and Slovakia, with lower support for conspiracy theories. A recent Globsec survey indicated that 50 per cent of Czechs viewed Russia and China as threats, demonstrating a higher awareness of authoritarian danger.

What does this mean for the EU?
Ultimately, once ANO successfully forms a government, its stance on a number of issues will depend on the level of co-operation with and dependence on its two far-right partners. The SPD has called for a referendum on EU and NATO membership, and the Motorists have pushed for rolling back the Green Deal – stances that would pull ANO increasingly to the far right.

The real trouble for the EU would go beyond the change in Czechia’s stance on these issues. A prospective alliance with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico – a partial revival of the Visegrad Group, which consisted of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – could create an additional headache for Brussels. Orbán and Babiš are co-founders of the far-right Patriots group in the European Parliament, and Fico’s (nominally left-wing) Smer could potentially join the grouping if it ends up being kicked out of the Socialists.

A renewed ‘rump’ Visegrad could have significant potential for disruption, even if for now it is unclear how closely Babiš would align with the other two. Fico has shown more pragmatism at the EU level than expected so far, but an alliance could allow the three countries to punch above their weight and influence discussions on several forthcoming files, including the next MFF (the multiannual financial framework, the EU’s seven-year budget), future sanctions packages, the climate agenda and enlargement. At the same time, drawn-out coalition talks in Czechia and a potential defeat for Orbán in the Hungarian elections in spring 2026 could significantly limit any influence a rump Visegrad would have. In fact, a defeat for Orbán – which, despite the opposition Tisza party’s strong showing in the polls, is still only a possibility – could all but demolish the alliance.

The outcome of the Czech elections could increase fragmentation within the EU and complicate collaboration on contentious files. It could also provide fresh impetus for new ‘coalitions of the willing’ to bypass gridlock. As we have seen with the resistance to European Council president Antonio Costa’s proposal on accelerating enlargement, which would eliminate unanimity for opening new chapters, agreeing on new ideas is already hard. If Czechia joins a rump Visegrad, the group would not be alone in its opposition to change.

Zselyke Csaky is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.